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Where to Begin In Changing
Undergraduate Education
The keynote address for the Annual M eeting of the Associa tion for General
and Liberal Studies a t C olgate University, O ctober 30-November 1, 1969,

By

CHARLE S FRANKE L

Where to begin in improving undergradua te educa tion seems to
me a la rge question with a number of answers. I think the place to
begin is the reorganiza tion of the academic community. It involves
putting organiza tions like this one a t a much higher level of visibility,
a rra nging that you know one another, tha t the important academic
organizations in the country know of you a nd listen to you, and tha t
people in the government be aware of you. There is not likely to be a
large-scale improvement of American h igher education without substantial forms of government support. The question of how to get
tha t support under conditions tha t do not compromise the colleges
and universities, how to get it fo r central m atters ra ther than fringe
m atters in education, is a question to which our government certainly
doesn't have the answer. I t needs a great deal of advice and pressure.
F rom this point of view, we in the academic world h ave been ama teurish, even lazy. W e believe in politics until we get right up close to the
process. W e like demonstration a t a distance from the people against
whom we' re demonstrating. The academic community, in pushing its
own immedia te professional interests, seems to me to have been doing
a second-ra te job.
A second problem is closely connected , but I'm not sure I know the
solution to it. I com e from a busy and happy day at Columbia, where
I did nothing from nine o'clock until four but talk to students. I felt
I ea rned my sala ry, and I also felt the University was living up to the
u nderstanding on which I came to it. But on W ed nesday of this week
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I spent the whole day on the phone lining up votes for the University
Senate; and tomorrow I shall spend the whole day on committees,
finishing with a University Senate meeting, all affecting the government of the University. In the United States now, and around the
world, we are in deep trouble with regard to the internal politics of
educational institutions.
The issues are important. Some of them are even educational or
quasi-educational. There is a good educational case to be made, I
believe, for extending the amount of participation by students and
faculty in the government of the institutions to which they belong.
But it is a limited case. The fundamental educational renovation
that is long overdue in this country is probably going to be delayed
until these political problems inside universities die down just a bit,
and we can give the time to education that we should.
Unhappily, that question isn't entirely up to the universities. Once
again, we come back to the government and to national policies which
the government is following. So long as these policies a re followed I
am pessimistic about peace on the university campus. The turmoil
on university campuses has relatively little to do with education, and
we are all suffering-students, teachers, and administrators- from this
fact. To the extent that we can discipline ourselves, to the extent that
we can talk sense with our students, I think it is important for us to
emphasize that there are some things we a re better able to do than
other things. We are better able to start renovating our own houses,
which badly need it, than to use the university to solve major
problems. I'm not advising anybody not to be a citizen; I m yself left
the university for awhile to do wha t I think a citizen should do. But
I think it is important to distinguish between the individual's responsibilities as a citizen and his responsibilities as a member of the university community. I am fearful that energy and intellectual attention
are being dissipated and turned aside from important educational m atters by the difficulties that now confront most campuses.
But now let me get to the specific problem of undergraduate education. Let me begin by giving you my own very general views as
to what liberal education is. To the extent that we are not doing the
job we should be doing in American colleges, we are not, I think,
giving students the liberal education they h ave a right to have, and
which, I think, most of them, in their heart of hearts, really want. The
trouble with the campus today, educationally speaking, is the decline
of the practice a nd indeed of the very theory of liberal educa tion.
Liberal education is not, in my view, a p a rticular curriculum or
course of study. It is a way of approaching the curriculum or any
course of study. Its first purpose is to try to help students to imagine
alternatives. Its function, in a word, is to widen, broaden, the imagination of the student. When I speak of alternatives, I mean alterna6

tives to wha t students normally think or normally feel-alternatives
to the status quo, to the habits, to the routine, to the social a rrangements, to which they have become accustomed, alternatives to existing
premises of thought and conduct in their society, alternatives to the
established theories and intellectual routines of the disciplines in which
they receive their instruction .
Thus, on one side, the function of liberal education is therapy.
Its function is to acquaint p eople with what may be merely arbitrary,
with wha t m ay be pur-ely the product of historical accident, or perhaps of prejudices and superstitions. Montesquieu, in writing The
Spirit of the Laws, said that he had one supreme intellectual purpose,
and that was to help his fellow men overcome their prejudices. And
in speaking of prejudices, he said that he did not mean the false views
which prevent them from understanding others but the false views
which prevent them from understanding themselves. Liberal education , a t the very least, is an effort, whether in physics or sociology or
philosophy, to bring to the level of conscious awareness the premises
which a re employed, a nd to acquaint students with the possibility
tha t alterna tive premises could be used and might even be better.
Liberal education is in this sense liberated education.
Thus, on the positive side, liberal education has a n imaginative
purpose. If it works, it functions to enla rge the student's capacity
to envisage new options, a nd to look behind the foreground of his
experience to la rger structures of expla nation and to the larger moral
a nd intellectual themes tha t lie in the background. To be liberally
educa ted is to have a n intellectu al capital that enriches one's life. It
permits one to approach his experience and see a richer texture of
m eaning in it. It is to h ave a kind of experience of life that moves on
a number of levels. It allows people to mix the normally antithetical
moods of engagement a nd disengagement, of passion and dispassion,
of commitment and tolerance, of pa rticipa tion a nd observation. Albert
Camus once rema rked tha t an intellectual is a m an who watches himself while he works. In tha t sense, the function of a liberal education
is to produce people, no matter what the field in which they work,
who wi ll be aware of themselves, wi ll be observing themselves, will be
c ritical of themselves as they work.
Now, if I am at all on target in this view of the nature of a liberal
education, it would follow that there are few subj ects, perhaps no
subj ects, tha t cannot be taught liberally. What counts is not the subject that is taught, but the way in which it's taught. To teach a subject liberally is to see it from the outside; to raise critical questions
about its underlying concepts and presuppositions ; to explain the
d evelopment of the subject as an event in time a nd society; to judge
the subject from the point of view of the light it throws on themes of
p assionate and perennial concern and on the basic moral and political
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issues of the student's own time. The student who has been liberally
educated h as been taught to build his intellectual and moral home in
a live cultural tradition or in a set of active intellectual disciplines tha t
transcend his own private concerns and that can sustain him in times
of crisis and trouble. From this point of view, a liberal education need
not be practical in the na rrow sense of the term ; but it is extrem ely
p ractical in a broad sense. If I may use a much overused word, it
might even be said to be a generally relevan t education.
I think most of us will admit that the colleges of the country are
not doing the job they should do in this respect. W e a re not providing
liberal education of a kind that satisfies either our own or our students'
views of what we should do. Why?
I have a simple hypothesis. W e don't have the teachers who can
do it, or the teachers who care to do it. We can sit around and pla n
curricular reforms from now till Doomsday, but they will die aborning
because we simply don't have enough people on college faculties or in
universities seriously interested in putting such refo rms into effect or
genuinely able to do so. I want to quote a rema rk tha t was once
made a t the meeting of the Associa tion of American Colleges:
" I feel that there has been enti rely too much of a tendency
toward highly specialized study in the graduate schools.
We in the colleges are looking for men of broad, sound training in their fields with enthusiasm for the general subj ect
and a wide generous interest in related subj ects, rather than
for m en of a highly specialized traini ng who express a lack
of interest or even contempt for other phases of their own
subj ect, to say nothing of the related fields of knowledge ."
This rem ark was made not in 1969, and not even in 1960. It was
made in 1925, a t the a nnual m eeting of the Association of American
Colleges. L ast year, as a consulta nt to V assar College cha rged to
d evelop some new notions on gradua te liberal education, I had the
opportunity to go through the records of m ajor educational organizations like the Associa tion of American Universities and the Associa tion of American Colleges. Wha t was striking and depressing was
the lita ny of complaint about the failures of liberal education. It
stretches back year after year for forty years, yet nothing, or very
little, has been done about it. The hypothesis tha t I offer to explain
this is that we don't have the teachers in adequate number who are
willing or able to put into effect the reforms tha t a re badly needed .
Why is this so ? If we can say why, we may be able to do something about the problem . M y own view is tha t we a re in the grip of
graduate schools that a re badly organized intellectually and educationally. W e are in the grip of a system of education which gives
prestige for the wrong reasons, which accords domina tion of the edu8

cational system to separate, quasi-autonomous departments concerned
mainly with protecting the walls of their disciplines, but not with education except tangentially; and we accept as .the qualifying certificate
for the profession of college teaching a degree which requires young
men and women at the richest and most fruitful periods of their lives
to spend their time, most of them, writing or studying matters of minor
concern scientifically or humanly. I'm speaking, of course, of the dissertation. The key question in reforming undergraduate education is
what can be done to reform the graduate school, so that it might
begin to come to grips with the problem that I have broached.
If we look at the problem in this way, we have, I believe, a number
of possible approaches available. At least three of these approaches
have been tried in one way or another. I am going to call them by
the following names: the encyclopedist approach ; the higher synthesis approach; and the interdepartmental approach. I don't have a
special name for the fourth approach that I am going to describe. It
is mine, so I shall call it the " right" approach .
First of a ll, the encyclopedist approach. Certain conceptions of
liberal education identify such education with a specific corpus of
survey materials, or with definite programs of what are known as
"general education," like the famous Columbia program in the humanities and contemporary civilization. This is a program, by the
way, in which I long participated and which I h appen to feel is a
fairly good program. However, I don't think it offers the only possible
p ath to a liberal or general education. And it has certain recurrent
problems built into it.
A general education program usually works by taking the graduate
student and asking him to give courses in general education a t the
undergraduate level. The reasons are, in part, to provide him with
financial support, but mainly to educate him-and, hopefull y, his students. This approach seems to me to be sometimes a good one. The
approach at Columbia produced among its products people like Lionel
Trilling, J acqu es Barzun, Irwin Edman and John H erman R andall.
M any of those who h ave been associated with these courses have become, in a certain sense, exemplars of encyclopedic knowledge. They
have learned a great deal, and they have been able to talk with some
understa nding, though not with unfailing accuracy, on a great m any
subjects.
However, those who h ave been successfully educated by teaching
in such courses are probably fewer than those who have not. Even
more, it has turned out to be extremely difficult to continue this kind
of education at Columbia beca use the professional, specializing pressures of the graduate school have grown so great that most graduate
students who are asked to undertake this kind of program regard
themselves as being forced to detour from their main career goals.
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Most do it under some duress. It is for them a sacrifice. They do not
gain professional prestige from participating in such work or from the
credentials they can produce as encyclopedically educated people.
However, the still deeper fault in this approach to liberal education is not a practical one. It is intellectual. One does not automatically educa te liberally simply by educating encyclopedically. One does
not produce the kind of self-critical, civilized a nd ironical mind which
it is the purpose of liberal education to produce simply by having
people become masters of all there is to be known. This can produce
its own form of pedantry, just as easily as narrow specialization. Even
worse, it can produce a form of dilettantism, a simulacrum of knowledge; it can lead to the failure to understand the difference between
solid mastery of a subject and skimpy conversational acqu aintance
with it. So there a re dangers in this approach. For this reason I
would regard it as a plausible approach only under fairly exceptional
conditions.
Let us turn to the second possible approach. I call this the higher
synthesis approach. It is represented in what was once the Chicago
experiment in liberal a nd general education, and in the so-called
"Great Books" tradition. This is not quite an encyclopedic approach;
rather it a rgues that there is a certain continuing and a perennial
conversation out of time, out of history, that characterizes civi lization.
And a liberal or general education consists in introducing students
to these great and unchanging themes of conversation from the great
and unchanging points of view tha t occur and recur through the
history of thought. This point of view, it seems to me, is one which
can be sustained in its pure form only if one wishes to ignore
wha t seems to be a fairly evident fact-that at least in certain
fields of inquiry there has been definite progress, a nd the themes being
explored today are not the themes which were of interest at the time
these disciplines were in their infancy. Physics is an example, biology
another. Unless I am mistaken, physicists and biologists are not just
going around in circles today, discussing the same themes that Aristotle discussed in his books. Aristotle's views on physics are extremely
interesting as an introduction to his remarkable mind, and as an introduction to the educated common sense of the Greeks. But as a n introduction to physics, they are, I think, an historical digression. The
same thing applies to his biology.
I do not believe that, from an intellectual point of view, the idea
of the Great Books stands up. I myself find it ha rd to pick out the
hundred or the thousand books knowledge of which constitutes an
education. This approach , to be sure, h as certain manifest merits.
There is a great deal to be said for a program of study which invites
people to acquaint themselves with the work of genuinely first-rate
minds. Not many books, perhaps none, raise the issues now debated
10

on America n campuses about the meaning, purpose and proper na ture
of education as trenchantly or urbanely as Pla to's R epublic . There
is a good deal to be said for the Great Books approach in this quite
simple sense. It is true, I think, that a man is not capable of teaching
well in a liberal a rts college unless he has more than a passing
acquaintance with figures like Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne or Dostoevski.
But while this is essential, it is not sufficient. L earning does not consist
simply in the mastery of the m ain themes of an eternal dialogue; it
also involves a comprehension of the tradition of reasoned inquiry
conceived as a progressive effort to relate our thoughts accurately and
effectively to facts that lie outside the huma n dialogue.
The third approach is one that has become increasingly popula r
lately, and is beginning to develop in m any graduate schools. This is
the interdepartmental approach. Here again, the story is not black and
white. I believe in interdepartmental studies; I certainly have committed enough of my own time to interdepartmental studies to have
to believe in them. But I retain deep suspicions about them. They
can perhaps be put in the following way: ( 1) Interdepartmental
studies are sometimes simply adj acent studies. They are not genuinely
interdepartmental. They a re ra ther courses in which people for three
weeks study economics, and then for three weeks sociology, and then
for three weeks study political science. They are a collection of short
courses in separate disciplines. I am not sure exactly what is gained,
although it is perfectly true tha t there are many courses in our colleges and universities which have very little to offer after the first three
weeks. (In that sense, there is a gain in making a person teach what
h e knows in three weeks rather than in three months.) But I think
that we have all had experience with interdepartmental studies in
which people never really h ave a meeting of minds, in which the re is
no such thing as coordinated inquiry or even systematic debate on a
common issue in terms of common standards. You simply have, as I
said, courses in the same intellectual neighborhood, given to the same
students consecutively.
(2) The second objection to interdepartmental studies is tha t they
frequently aren't even what I've d escribed. They are simply studies
that don't belong to any department of learning. They are not interdisciplinary but nondisciplinary studies. They lack any discipline at
all. They're bull sessions. This kind of effort seems to me to be retrograde. At the undergraduate or at the graduate level the one thing
that h as to be communicated is the idea that study of any problem
is something that has to meet certain standards of logic, of argument,
of evidence. To the extent that interdisciplinary studies make the very
concept of discipline seem evanescent and too fluid, I am suspicious of
them. For this reason I would not myself be inclined to say that people
at the graduate level should be prepared for undergraduate teaching
11

by being given a heavy dose of so-called interdisciplinary studies. And
yet I have some sympathy for them, as you will see, when I begin
to describe what I would consider the "right" approach.
Let me make one prefatory remark before I suggest to you what
I would like to see tried as the "right" approach. The English
language is often very difficult, and the definite article "the" causes
a lot of trouble. I offer you a model of what I think is the " right" approach. But the particular model that I offer you is not the only possible model. Conversations and discussions like the one in which we
are now engaged may in fact generate other possible approaches;
moreover, we are fortunate in this country that we have a pluralistic
system of education. I would deplore the absolute disappearance of
the Grea t Books tradition or style of education. I would deplore the
absolute disappearance of the encyclopedic ideal. Wha t I am talking
about is simply the d evelopment of still another approach, and a n
approach to which I would hope major em phasis would be given by
way of serious experimentation.
What, then, would this approach be? It seems to me it would be
possible to organize, in m ajor graduate universities, sets of graduate
colleges. The faculty of some liberal arts colleges might also wish to
organize a graduate college, for example, as an adjunct to their activities. The graduate college would have a faculty of twenty to twentyfive people who are chosen from, say, ten to twelve disciplines or
departments. However, they would function not as a collection of
departments, but as a single faculty. The first problem in reorganizing
graduate education, if I'm right, is to take the education of the future
college teacher out of the hands of departments and put that education in the hands of people who see themselves as conducting an educational enterprise aimed at producing people who will themselves
be educators.
I am not talking about courses in pedagogy; I am talking about
something else quite simple. If a M an from M a rs took the education
of the average sociologist in America today and looked a t the amount
of time he spends on various things, he would infer tha t the student
was going to spend three-qua rters of his working life polling or doing
market research or something of that kind. I think it's essential that
sociologists learn these methods by using them. But the fact of the
m a tter is that most sociologists spend most of their working lives
teaching in colleges. Yet they lea rn relatively little about the history
of their own discipline, about the sociology of sociology, about the
philosophy of sociology, and the like.
I feel strongly about this because I h ave had to sit on many examining committees for doctoral dissertations in my discipline and others.
Usually, the subj ect is of infinitesimal importance, and of m eager intellectual value. It seems to me cruel to ask a person to spend three
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or four yea rs of his life doing this sort of chore. We have much in
our educa tional system, undergraduate a nd graduate, that's penological : I m ean that we appear to act on the assumption tha t if p eople
put in a certain amount of h ard labor----or, with undergraduates, if
they accept detention for a hund red and twenty-four hours- we will
let them out. W e do this in gradua te schools: the student produces a
hunk of work-you sometimes can't ca ll it a piece of work-and we
give him a degree. Sometimes it's because we can't bear the sight of
him any longer. These a re open secrets; I'm not a cynic, I'm only
saying what everybody knows. It seems to me tha t to deal with this sort
of problem , we have got to reorganize the work of graduate professors, so tha t, in addition to their quite proper loyalty to their discipline, they will be required to consider their impact, along with that
of their colleagues, on definite human beings, namely, their students.
This is why I would organize graduate colleges.
The second element in m y proposal would be to select students,
and to sit down with them and find out what their interest is, what
their intellectual p assion is. And I would not put the question to them
as, "Are you interested in economics?" "Are you interested in political science ?" "Are you interested in philosophy ?" I would ask, "Why
do you want to go on studying?" And if the student then said, "I
love the romantic p oets," we would then ask together, "What should
one know to be a serious specialist in the romantic poets? What, ind eed, do you have to know so that you won't be taken in by those
seductive fellows, so that you will h ave some external powers of
criticism with resp ect to them ?"
If you put the problem that way, you find that the divisions
between depa rtments that now exist in our graduate schools a re
bureaucratic devices, instruments of administrative convenience and
conservatism. Consider what you have to know to understand the
romantic poets. C ertainly you have to read the romantic poets. But
one of the things they reacted to, one of the things they were responding to, was the grea t N ewtonian scientific revolution of the
eighteenth century. How m any professors of English understand anything about this? How many professors of English ha ve passed on to
their students, indeed, the ignorant prejudices of the romantic poets
about the eighteenth century scientific revolution? Why do we h ave
a conflict of two cultures? Why is our society p aying for the continua tion of this polemic, based very largely on party interests and on
ignorance? The answer, in pa rt, is that our gradua te schools are
organized to p roduce just this kind of professional deforma tion, just
this kind of arrogant learned ignorance. If a person wants to understand the romantic poets, h e must certainly understand what the
romantic poets thought of Newton. But he also should understand
what Newton thought of Newton, and what the scientists of the period
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thought. He doesn't have to become a physicist to understand this, but
he does have to sit down and have a chance to talk with some physicists or historians or scientists.
What else should one know if he wants to understand the romantic
poets? The French R evolution-a minor event which had some influence on them. He should know something, too, about the Industrial Revolution. The romantic poets thought that the Industrial
Revolution was responsible for the misery in the cities, tha t it was
responsible for the people they saw dying on the roads. They were
only half right. The fact of the matter was, as we now know, that
there was a sudden upsurge of population in the eighteenth century.
For a variety of reasons, the countryside of England was incapable of
supporting the rural popula tion. The people swarming into the cities
were not simply the product of the expropriation tha t went with industrialization, although tha t was part of it. They were also the results of what was called in that period "overpopulation." From tha t
point of view, the Industrial R evolution was a boon, not a scourge.
Without this Industrial Revolution, starvation in Engla nd would have
been much worse. The romantic poets were nostalgic about the
England that was lost. Their nostalgia m ay not have been entirely misplaced , but it was based to some extent on their fau lty knowledge
of their own situation. If you're going to teach the romantic poets,
if you're going to teach about the things tha t they were concerned
about, and if you're a liberal scholar, you ought to know enough
sociology or economics to say something more than they could say
about which they spoke.
If what I have said is true, another point also follows. A welleducated man in his specialty will be a man who knows how to pull
together material from other disciplines wherever they may be relevant to his subject, relevant to his problem. He is, if you will, interdepartmental, but he doesn't fall between two stools. He is, if you will,
synthetic, but it isn't in terms of some abstract philosophy preformula ted for him. The ultimate instrument for the integration of knowledge
is the individual mind, and the ultima te condition for integrating
knowledge is to define some problem with respect to which a variety
of kinds of information are relevant. From this point of view, it would
be possible, it seems to me, to organize a student's graduate education
so that he developed the habit of looking a t the things that interest
him from more than one point of view. He would then h ave, as it
were, two intellectual strings to his bow, or three. He would be conversant with the kind of insight to be gained in fields other than his
own. He would himself have an external point of view towa rd his
own interests. In this sense, he would enact a model of liberal scholarship that might be contagious to undergraduate students. He m ight
offer an approach to a subject ma tter which was in its own way
liberal.
14

But now we must ask the question: "How do you give a degree
to this sort of chap? How would you test him? Would you give him
a Ph .D. , a nd would it be in English or would it be in philosophy or
would it be in what-have-you?" My own response would be that we
should give a d egree, a Ph.D., and a degree in a discipline. I don't
think it's a good idea to h ave professors of English who don't know
any science or history or sociology. But if their central interest is the
romantic poets, their profession is English litera ture . Similarly, I don't
think it's a good idea to have physicists who don't know anything
about the relation of physical research to, let us say, the governmental
policies of a given period, or who have no sense of the sociology of
physics. But the physicist must above all know physics, and, in the
end, tha t is the subject in which he would get his degree.
How would you give him his degree? On the basis of wha t credentials, what showing? At this point, it seems to me, there should
be no absolute rules. There would be cases where an original piece
of research in the modern dissertation form is justified . But it seems
to me tha t the dissertation as it is now undertaken in our great universiti es, and as it is now accepted in eighty per cent of the cases in
our great universiti es, is so far away from the ideal which is supposed
to justify it that we m ay as well give it up as a bad bargain in eighty
per cent of the cases. What is it supposed to do? It is supposed to
m ake a contribution to knowledge. Well, to begin with, this seems
to me to get students off on the wrong foot for the rest of their lives.
An essenti al element not only in good teaching but in first-ra te intellectual work is taste; a nd taste, whatever else it may be, certainly involves some sense of whether you're dealing with an important problem or not, or a t least some sense of what is important in the small
problem with which you are dealing. The lack of such taste is
peda ntry.
To give degrees to people by asking them to meet the demand of
making a contribution to knowledge is, in an overwhelming number
of cases, to ask them to destroy or forget taste. It is to ask them to
m ake a contribution to knowledge of such a kind tha t few sensible
m en would devote their time to making such "contributions" unless
they were obliged to. There are very few dissertations that actually
m ake contributions to knowledge. And of these, the overwhelming
proportion h ad better not have been written. The "contributions" are
piddling and pointless. And all of us in "the Ph.D. business" know
this.
Is there a n alterna tive? I think so. If a young man wants to be a
professor of classics, wha t is wrong with asking him to write a hundred
good pages-not new, just good- on O edipus R ex? I remember
h earing a debate a t the Aristotelia n Society in England some years
ago. A man read a paper and then the commentator stood up and
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said, "There's much tha t's new and much that's true in the paper
we've just hea rd, but what's new isn't true and what's true isn't new."
It seems to me much more important that what a person says in his
dissertation be true and important and worth passing on to students
than that it be new. If a gradua te student can add to our knowledge,
fine. By all means, he should be encouraged to do so. But to ask him
to master, to put in his own way, to bring to life, the best that has
been thought and said on O edipus is a possible, and equally important,
intellectual task to put before him. It ought to be the kind of account
that would implicitly explain why anybody who might be thinking of
going to the movies would do better to read O edipus. This is not
plain to students usually, and if a teacher can't explain tha t to students, he's losing the game.
Could we, over the course of three or four years of study of the
kind I have described, ask graduate students to produce four or five
first-rate essays, first-rate intellectual performances, without asking
them to produce an imitation book? Would this be a better use of
their time? And would it h elp produce in their minds a better sense
of what the creative intellectual life is? I believe so. Somone may say
that this involves separating teaching from scholarship. I do not think
so. I believe it might improve scholarship. If we improve schola rship, I think we will improve teaching. If we have better minds with
more taste for wha t's important, if they know more than one thing,
h ave more than one intellectual string to their bow, they can do the
job that I would hope can be done in American colleges and
universities.
Is this an impossible idea? At the moment, what with turmoil on
the campus and a distracted and parsimonious government suspicious
of education, the outlook isn't very good. But one h as to assume tha t
our present condition is not going to last forever. And in the meantime we h ave to try to make our own opportunities. It seems to me
that there are places in America, a number of places, where experim ents of this sort could be tried, and it also seems to me tha t there are
m any liberal a rts colleges which would be extremely eager to have on
their staffs the products of such an educational experiment.
In any case, whatever your views of this particular idea, all our
talk and all our plans and schemes for a revival of liberal undergraduate education in the United States are likely to turn out to be empty
unless we can find a way to manage the problem of discovering and
educating better teachers, who will want to carry on the task of liberal
edu cation and will have the equipment to do so. The reform of undergradua te education has to begin at the graduate level.
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PANEL 1
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The Role of the Undergraduate
College in Social Change
All social change, without exception, involves a process in human
lea rning. Social ch ange, indeed, is an evolutionary process in the field
of the "noosphere," especially if we include in this those human
artifac ts which are the result of imprinting human knowledge on the
m a terial and social world.
There a re ma ny sources of learning, most of which, however,
can be put into one of three groups. One source is experience, that
is, inputs of info rma tion into the huma n nervous system from the outside world through the senses. W e know som e things because we see,
hear, smell, taste, and touch them. E xperience is a pretty good teacher
in the small, but a very bad teacher in the la rge. It can teach us
about the world with which we are in immedia te contact, with considerable accuracy. Otherwise, we could not find our way around
town. But it is a poo r teacher when we come to large systems, either
physical, biological, or socia l. Generalizing from personal experience,
indeed, is one of the m ajor sources of fallacious thinking, especially in
social systems, producing such things as the theory of the fla t earth
and beliefs in bala nced budgets and na tional defense.
L anguage is another important source of human learning, especially gossip, tha t is, verbal communication from peers. This m ethod of
learning is rapid and quite often produces truth, though not always.
It is particula rl y useful because it uses the human nervous system as
a n in forma tion filter, which is absolutely necessary if we are not to be
overwhelmed by the input-overload of information . Knowledge of any
kind usually has to be obtained by an orderly loss of information input
through som e fil tering process. We see this even in perception, where
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there is, for instance, loss of information all the way from the eye to
the brain.
The third source of human learning consists of t.eachers, who,
again, rely mainly on language, both oral and written, but whose main
function is to guide a student towards the great information deposits
of mankind-in the written word, in pictures, records of speech and
music, and so on. The results of formal education, as we know, are
varied. We must be doing something right or we would never have
succeeded in transmitting as much of the past culture as we do. It
is a never-ending miracle that we do succeed in transmitting most of
past cultures to the next generation. Nevertheless, there is no cause
for great satisfaction about formal education. It is probably more
wasteful than it need be, we know very little about it or about the
process of human learning, and we are always in real danger of cultural loss through the failure to transmit to the next generation. We
should always remember that the growth of knowledge is the difference
between its production and its consumption through aging and death.
This consumption is very large and the more knowledge there is the
more it is consumed. Furthermore, the more elaborate the knowledge
structure becomes the more important teaching and formal education
become in proportion to the other means of learning.
There are two major processes in human learning. One is
imprinting or rote learning, which in formal education has become the
principle "from textbook to bluebook untouched in mind." Nevertheless, we must not underestimate the importance of rote learning
and the importance of doing it efficiently. A great deal of language
learning has to be rote learning, and even in the arts and sciences the
learning of names is a crucial part of formal education. One of the
most important distinctions between the learned and the unlearned
is precisely the greater capacity of the learned for name-dropping.
If you think Plato, or even Pluto, is merely a character in a comic strip,
this is a clear sign of not having much formal education.
The other process for learning might be called revisionism. This
is the essence of the scientific method, but it is also important in what
we might call folk learning. This process operates through the formation of images of the future by inference from total image of the
world, and then the comparison of our image of the future, as we had
it in the past, with our image of the same event when the future becomes the present. If the two images do not correspond there is disappointment, and it is disappointment that forces revision. If the
process is to lead to knowledge, however, the revision must take place
in the image of the world and we must be protected against failures
of inference or observation. This is, incidentally, why mathematics
has been so important to the sciences as a safeguard against false inference, and why instrumentation has been so important as a safeguard
against false observation.
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As long as imprinting or rote learning is the principal method of
knowledge transmission social change comes m ainly by differential
fertility of different human cultures, assuming that the transmission
of the culture is by imprinting from one genera tion to the next. Under
these circumstances, it is fertile cultures in the popula tion sense that
survive. Even under these circumstances, there may be phenomena
like conversion from one culture to another. In this case, we should
p robably describe the process as tha t of differential informa tion
fertility or image fertility.
Social change through revisionism is apt to be more rapid and
m ore fund amental. It ta kes place when there is a failure of transmission of the culture from one generation to the next because of disappoin tment. Cultures which stress revisionism rather than imprinting a re, therefore, likely to h ave a more rapid rate of social change
than traditional cultures, which rely on the authority of the older genera tion to imprint its patterns on the next.
What, then, in this process is the role of the undergraduate college ? W e have to face the fac t that a good deal of wha t goes on in
the undergraduate college is imprinting, the learning not onl y of
langu ages a nd of names for things, but also the values of the prev;:i iling cul tu re . One object, whether avowed or not, of the undergradua te college is the p roduction of adults who quite strongly resemble their parents. This function is not altogether to be despised,
fo r if children are too differe nt from their parents, society will fall
apa rt. There is simply not time to invent the wheel and all the other
elements in the great deposit of accumulated human knowledge and
technology in every generation. I t is perhaps the reasonably literate,
reasonably docile, name-dropping, organiza tion man who holds the
world together and we certainly produce a reasonable quantity of such
m en.
On the other h and, we do find that educational systems in general, and the undergraduate college in particular, are being increasingly challenged to produce revisionist knowledge based on what might
almost be called sophisticated experience. The very fac t that the
undergradua te college is a major link between the world of folk
knowledge and folk culture and the world of wha t I have called the
"superculture" of science and technology means that it has to introduce the student to the scientifi.: revisionist m ethod. There then
a rises an almost inevitable confli ct between the revisionism, skepticism,
a nd universalism of the superculture and the more traditional believing a nd pa rochial subcultures and na tional cultures, which, for
the most pa rt, pay the bills. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
college becomes an agency of social change so vigorous as to embarrass its finance officers. This dilemma, however, I cannot resolve in
this p aper.
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The institution in which we a re meeting is a striking example of
what I am trying to say. When I was an instructor here in the la te
thirties, the transmission of the traditional football culture, which I am
afraid I once described as "colinanity," and the worldly wise culture of the fraternities, was a dominant part of the student experience.
Today, I am immensely struck with the change in the appearance
and indeed the whole culture of the student body. While there a re
strong elements of imprinting and fashion even in the culture of
youthful dissent, nevertheless, a great deal of social change which is
taking place, and of which the colleges are an important focus, a rises
out of revisionist learning, and especially that most tricky of all processes, the revisionist learning of values. This again would carry us far
beyond the purposes in this paper.
Kenneth E. Boulding

00
We ought to be clear at the start that the academic disciplines
and the undergraduate college have not had any great impact on
social change. Historically, social change in our culture has been
brought about by broad economic movements (industrializa tion ),
by massive technological changes (bureaucracies, new technologies ),
and by what one might call powerful forces in popula r psychology
( nationalism, liberalism). In any such listing it is difficult to perceive
any extensive impact of general ideas or humanistic education as it
is received in the college.
Ideas and ideologies do, of course, have a mighty impact on social
change. But in our culture, ideas and ideologies have played a major
role only if they have been taken up and given power by sizable social
classes and groups who find them appropriate to their economic
interests, political power needs, or general sense of values. Thus classical liberalism gained force in England because it fit the interests of
the commercial, industrial, and professional middle classes. European
socialism-another complex body of ideas-gained influence because
the working classes of northern Europe found such ideas compatible
with their economic interests. Finally, conservative ideologies a nd
ideas h ave been supported by upper class social groups because of
their wish to defend their power and interests . Ideas and ideologies,
in short, have affected social change only when they h ave been "picked
up" by groups and classes engaged in competition for political and
economic power. What is taught in college h as no significant role to
play in any direct way.
There is another important reason why the academic disciplines
have played only a minimal role in the various transformations of
our culture. The intellectual structure of our academic disciplines
since their inception in the early nineteenth century has been observa-
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tional and not critical or pragmatic. Economists, historians, sociologists,
and political scientists have created and practiced their disciplines so
as to understand and explain, rather than to criticize and change.
Thus the crucial science of economics derived, in Western culture,
from Newtonian science and deist theology. From the time of Adam
Smith until just recently, therefore, economists have sought for the
n atural laws (earlier "the invisible hand" or "the laws of God") of
economics which allegedly regulate economic behavior in such ways
as to make rational planning on a large scale foolish and dangerous.
In all areas, in fact, the liberal intellect has overwhelmingly denied
as despotic, naive, or utopian any notion that the intellect can plan,
direct, and manage in any forceful way the growth and change of
society in preconceived directions. And it is preeminently the liberal
intellect or, even more suspicious of planning, the conservative intellect which guides, controls, and gives content to our undergraduate
education. At best the liberal intellect still clings to what one can only
describe as "tinkering" when it comes to the resolution of our seemingly
ever-present social problems.
What, in view of all this, does the college actually accomplish with
regard to social change? Almost nothing except that it turns out people who, whatever their vocation, have a smattering of ignorance
about some subjects outside of their regular vocations. Indeed, the
college is, excluding a few experimental units, an advanced form of
trade or vocational school . People are trained in the techniques of a
profession or calling, but those techniques are set by those in the
profession and outside the college. Lawyers, physicians, teachers,
businessmen, and labor leaders are prepared to play the accepted roles
of their future professions. In spite of the vaguely reformist rhetoric
often communicated by academic people-themselves rarely social
activists-there is little done to reshape, reconstitute and re-form the
existing ways of the world .
It could be argued we do change society by educating a vast collection of liberal artists in the enlightened and useful knowledge
known to those who teach the study of history, society, politics, and
the arts. But whatever these studies may have been in the past, today,
alas, they are nothing if not vocational. My meaning is quite specific.
The Professor of History, Sociology, Political Science or whatever, is
not out to communicate whatever his field can to the creation of an
educated lay public aware of the need for social reform and some
expert ways of going about it. No, the Professor is on the lookouteven in his freshman classes-for future majors, i.e., potential vocational specialists in his discipline. Like higher trade school functionaries, your historians, for example, measure their teaching success
by the number and quality of the undergraduates they send on to gradu ate departments of history. Historians are really not interested in
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teaching whatever it is in the past that throws most light on present
culture and contemporary needs. They are on the lookout for
students who, as future historians, will devote themselves to ever
smaller segments of the p ast and write, in the main, not for an enlightened, literate, and potentially activist public but for fellow professionals in similar segments of the discipline.
Thus social change in our culture h as not been affected in any
independent or forceful way by the college. And until we can get
the college out of the grip of the graduate school professionals, we
will not be able to redirect our colleges toward the creation of the
kind of public we need. It is not a question of publishing and resea rch versus teaching. Rather, it is simply that the kind of publication and research that graduate schools reward is not intended for
public consumption and contemporary cultural needs. And it is the
graduate faculties which p ass out the cash, prestige, and grants which
attract the ambitious and talented among scholars. As long as this
is true, the colleges of America will simply not put much effort into
the creation of a massive public of functioning intellectuals.
I can suggest no way to weaken the gradua te school's domina tion
of undergr2dua te education. Yet more than ever we need the power
of a conscious and sizable public intellect to grapple with our social
problems. One need only think of our slums, the world's poverty and
population explosion, and the ever-mounting threa t of biological and
nuclear war to envision the kinds of possibilities before us. Yet poverty, population, and the origins of wars are eminently teachable subjects, and ever-increasing millions of students enter our colleges to be
taught.
As I said, I can suggest no strategy which will dram a tically alter
the role of the college in furthering rational and humane social change.
But I do think I can suggest some fairly well-known ways in which we
should change if opportunities come our way. We must totally revise
the content of undergraduate courses in the social sciences and drastically change our teaching methods. Above all we must remove the
single greatest obstacle to such reforms: faculty reluctance to innovate
and to re-shape the professional system of prestige and promotion.
There a re a wide variety of ways to improve the undergraduate
experience through teaching and course content curriculum:x- I have
time for only one suggestion. Course content is now decided almost
completely by the traditional divisions and contents of the disciplines
as determined by the guild of graduate school professors. W e ought
to focus instead on our current cultural needs and student interest.
*For a discussion of some of these see: John Weiss, "The University as Corporation ," Radical Perspectives on Social Problems, Frank Lindenfeld (Ed.)
MacMillan, 1968.
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T o cite one glaring example----one h esita tes to call it a burning issueVietnam . We h ave been fighting in Vietnam for fifteen years, a nd
the wa r h as been the single most important national concern . But
courses of study about Indochina, let alone Vietnam, have found no
place in the undergradua te curriculum. Nor am I merely speaking of
a course of study concerning "America in Vietnam." To understand
why our policies there h ave been nothing but absurd a nd a trocious
from the sta rt, we h ave to study the history and society of Vietnam
since a t least the time of the original F rench conquests and the guerrilla resistance-i.e., since roughly the 1850's. Then, whether one is
against or for the ugly disaster there, one would have known from
the study of Vietnamese history th at our military solution would solve
nothing, and tha t it could only end in blood, retreat, and terror fo r the
Vietnam ese. However, though our schola rs have fou nd a place in the
curriculum for the Greeks, the Romans, the Europeans, a nd endless
segments of Americana, no place h as been provided in the college
ca talog for the Vietnamese.
If disciplined schola rship does not constantly feed into the curriculum such crucial m atters for scholarly study and communication,
why then is it any wonder tha t the deba te on Vietnam, pro and con,
has been mindless a nd uninformed? Only now are we beginning to
teach the history of Vietnam-at perhaps a dozen institutions of higher
learning. F abulous. At this rate, one can expect m any courses in the
origins of wa rs the day after W orld Wa r III takes place! If disciplined
schola rship does not put our political a nd social problems into the curriculum, then the uninformed will picket, protest, and ignore our
claim that schola rship and lea rning a re important in the life of man.
Finally, allow me to point out that those subjects that a re now in
the college catalog were not always there and should not be taken to
be absolute, fixed, and fi nal standa rds of wha t ought to be known.
Intellectuals, with or without Ph.D.'s, have always forced the
academy to take account of those subjects that the new generation finds
relevant to its life. Thus, we ought not to obj ect to the current dem ands for black studies and history in our colleges. Educational and
schola rly advances h ave often come through the militant demands
of nationalists, black or otherwise, who wanted to establish a cultural
and historical identity for their brothers.
German history, perhaps the most orthodox of " legitimate and
established" obj ects of academic orthodoxy was in fact put in the
college catalogs in much the same way as is now ha ppening to black
history. The invasion of the G ermanies by N apoleon led to a war of
na tional libera tion, which brought to a head a decade's agitation by
young intellectuals for German unity. After the defeat of the French,
academic studies of Germ an history were established, the German
language a nd the G erman "spirit", i.e., its cul tural identity, were for
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the first time legitimate objects of academic concern. Until then,
German history was not pa rt of the accepted program of studies.
This general sea rch for national self-consciousness, this sense of the
need for contemporary relevance in academic studies, led to the
establishment of that most orthodox of academic institutions, the
University of Berlin ( 1809 ), and the formal beginning of German
historical studies. Above all, out of this came the creation of a m arvelous educational system, scholarly, disciplined, and releva nt, which
awakened in Germans a sense of their cultural identity and na tional
pride. (Those who mistakenly believe tha t this in any way led to the
success of the N azis in our time should see: John Weiss, Th e Fascist
Tradition: Radical R ight W ing E xtremists in Modern Euro pe, H arper
and Row, 1967.)
There is, in short, no reason to be suspicious of the legitimacy and
value of black studies as ultimately leading to the same unity of disciplined scholarship and contemporary importance. In m atters of
course content alone we must shake off the traditional discipline divisions which reflect the sense of relevance of past generations a nd look
a t that which involves the n eeds and the spirit of today. Tha t, in
fact, is why we study the liberal arts: so tha t they will liberate us.
John Weiss
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Environmental Components
of Liberal Education
In the last 10 years a great d eal has been learned about college
environments. We know that five basic patterns have evolved in
American higher education, each constituting an ecological niche for
its own distinctive student types. The psychological characteristics of
the most productive college environments-those J acob called the
high-impact arts colleges-have been described now in considerable
detail. Furthermore, the same properties of these environments that
have been found to be so peculiarly faci litative of personal growth and
self-actualiza tion have also been discovered to be associated with
organizational effectiveness in other types of settings: secondary
schools, industrial sites, and Peace Corps training programs. I would
refer you here to my book: People in Context, New York: Wiley, 1969.
But it is my feeling now that there is a far more serious problem
in higher education today tha t makes any discussion of environmental
factors appear almost frivolous by comparison. Despite the great
differences between the five college cultures, in the basic organiza tion
of their curricula they are all much alike. And it is tha t curriculum,
the final flowering of the new American university, that embodies the
m ajor contradictions of contemporary society.
Almost without exception all undergradua te schools are organized
into departm ents representing the disciplines to be found in the graduate schools. The undergraduate program for the junior and senior
years consists of course offerings designed by each department for its
majors, the student pool from which graduate school material is
d rawn. All students, majors and non-majors alike, are given lecturediscussion guidance through a literature considered essential by way
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of prepa ra tion for subsequent graduate trammg. Universities so unfortunate as to have substantial numbers of undergradua tes unable
to handle such courses successfull y do not develop an alterna tive curriculum but run everyone through the same content anyway, watered
down to the level of the " regul a r" m ajors and stiffened by more rigorous special sections, courses or requirements for the so-called "professionals" who a re the only ones considered seriously in the graduate
school track.
In the first two years of the university the student credit-hour crop
on which each departmental economy d epends is grown. Area and distribution requirements divide the 60 hours of the lower division among
ba ronial m anors, assuring each depa rtment its share and protecting
one another against predatory barba rians grabbing land for enterprises
tha t lack gradua te school ties. Once the home of courses in general
education, the freshman and sophomore years a t the university are
now given over entirely to introductory courses intended to provide
an overview of all of the options for la ter specialization ( courses which
few of the senior faculty have the breadth to teach! ), supplemented by
the few general tools like English or m a th which it is agreed everyone
must have regardless of whose vineyard in which he m ay later labor.
The lower division courses are taught by departmental expendablesgraduate students and junior faculty-whose real preoccupations a re
elsewhere and who may actually damage their own careers if they
become too seriously involved with undergradua te teaching.
Gradua te school faculty represent an elite, highly select population
of faculty PhD's. They a re recruited in a m a rketpl ace tha t is extremely sensitive to the acad emic rank of the schools a nd d epa rtments
in which they received their training, and critically judgmental of a
candida te's potential for research, publication, and program building.
H aving been weighed repea tedly for these same qualities from the time
of their initial admission to graduate school as students, the culls
either discouraged from entering the university marketplace or barred
from it entirely with a terminal MA, those PhD's who become faculty
in graduate programs are unquestionably the most aggressive, ambitious, energetic, counteractive, articula te, pragmatic, and intellectually faci le of all graduate school products, a nd committed both vocationally a nd by personal conviction to the development of others like
themselves.
It is in this respect tha t the graduate disciplines in the arts and
sciences h ave come to be the determining fo rce in educa tion, reaching
down through the colleges and high schools to the elementary grades
to channel the brightest and the most successfully motiva ted into the
tracks that lead on specifically to the gradua te schools. The secondbest fall out to other careers; the best a re encouraged to work towa rd
PhD's, and the very best to join in training others. The entire school
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system has become academia's way of reproducing itself.
The original model for the university was entirely functional in
a d eveloping country struggling to achieve universal secondary education a nd needful of every scientist and technician it could produce. A
program which ensures a little knowledge in m any fields and a lot of
it in one is an efficient way of producing technologists who are
specialized yet capable of understanding related areas of interest. The
p attern for the American university was laid down in the late 19th
century, a t a time when industrializa tion was just beginning to take
firm hold a nd the traditional church-affiliated colleges were no longer
adequa te to train the new types of men who were needed. Americans
who had gone abroad to learn science in the German universities
brought back a curriculum model on which to build here at home.
In 1870 however, only two in 100 American 18-year-olds gradua ted from high school and both were likely to get a terminal BA degree
as well. The diversified universi ty curriculum was a ra tional way to
maximize institutional resources for the purpose of educa ting the whole
of this small and homogeneous community of men. Today 80 in 100
18-year-olds gradua te from high school, of whom 44 will enter college
and 24 will finish. Only one of these will get a PhD, the purpose for
which almost every element in the present undergraduate university
curriculum has been developed. The program is now designed for only
two per cent of those who are admitted to it, a singularly inefficient
and dysfunctional way of educating people.
As long as participa tion in higher education was voluntary, access
to it a privilege rather than a right, a nd gradua tion from it a seeming
requirement for achievement in a competitive society, the universities
continued to evolve towards their present sta te largely unquestioned.
But the success of the same technology for which the universities were
created has brought them to their present crisis. The labor force,
once predominantly agrarian, is now divided almost equally between
blue and white-collar workers. The blues are d ecreasing relative to
the whites furthermore, and the percentage of professionals has risen
from 3 per cent of the labor force in 1870 to 14 p er cent in 1968.
Productivity can be m aintained on an ever-declining base of
laborers and machine operators, but the conversion of these displaced
workers from the bottom of the labor pyramid to white-collar employment is more than a problem of retraining. Education continually
brings the average level of intelligence up, but productive economic
utilization of people from the lower half of the IQ distribution is being
eroded more rapidly than new occupa tional categories can appear
to absorb them.
A successful technology that no longer requires and indeed cannot employ a large labor force has turned the concept of the leisure
class on its head. We have begun the transition to a consummatory,
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leisure society, but it is being realized first by those who a re too poorly
equipped to be employable and who must therefore be subsidized.
These are surplus people in a scarcity economy, for whom the
graded educational system designed to fit m en to the needs of a
competitive society must necessarily be both custodial a nd irrelevant.
But there are no surplus people in a leisure economy, only surplus
goods and time, and the fun ction of education under those circumstances will be to equip every one to use both creatively. The new
cu rriculum must be designed not for society but for m an himself. It
must be based on those inva riant biological properties which so characterize m an tha t to maximize the opportunities for their development
is to optimize the opportunity for each individual to approach the
utmost expression of humankind of which he is capable.
The elements of such a curriculum for man can be derived from
the evidence of early childhood. M anual dexterity, social interaction,
esthetic response, a nd linguistic capacity constitute four sources of
spon ta neous gratification in early life. If the student were taken as
the integrating center of a curriculum composed of successively more
complex forms of these four elements, permitting his own inductive
capacities to lead him on from one level to the next, a form of education would emerge which mi ght be said to be uniquely human. What
is envisaged here is the sponta neous genera tion of activities facilitating
the ultima te growth of which man is capable, rather tha n the continued fitting of huma ns to the limited ca tegories of their predecessors.
This is the form which education must take in the new social era tha t
li es a head.
George G. Stern
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A STUDENT PERSPECTIVE
Our analysis of the environmental components of a liberal education will of necessity reflect a student viewpoint. We feel tha t the
student's college experiences should facilita te his removal of obstacles
to self actualiza tion.
The receipt of a n A.B. degree means not only a ticket to fin ancial
success, the leaping of a hurdle before entering a social elite, or a step
toward enrollment in a professional discipline. The college experience
should encompass some broader a reas of basic human concern, a nd be
unified a round a theme of defining wha t m an can know a nd do, not
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a constmction of preconceived notions defining the composition of an
educated m an. And ultima tely the student must arrive at his own
definition .
Such an educa tion should involve the student in a total-immersion
situa tion with no compartmentaliza tion into a rtificial disciplines or
restrictions to the classroom. Curricula must become tools to serve
student needs, ra ther than restrictive pre-professional guides and
academic exercises. The strangling influence of present grading procedures inhibits intellectual curiosity and perpetua tes antagonism between instructor a nd student. W e feel tha t grades and liberal education a re h a rdl y compa tible.
The professor would be the key element in the institution's interaction with the student. With his students, he would develop courses
to suit their needs and his own. W e feel a small personalized structure with close facu lty-student relationships offers the most opportunities for individuals to maximize their learning. Students' va ried needs
can be met adequately by individualized modifications in the overall
educative process.
The cam pus-centered activities would be designed to integrate a
student's off-campus life experiences with his other studies. Travel
and work experience would definitely be a pa rt of the curriculum,
alterna ting with on-campus semina rs a nd proj ects to evalua te and
assimila te recent knowledge. D eveloping individual techniques of
problem solving would characterize the course of study.
The final characteristics of our ideal would be small size a nd a
teaching oriented reward system. While it is conceivable tha t large
schools can implement true liberal education, they would have to
function as sub-units within the larger system , for the rich contact between pa rticipants germane to the success of the liberal education is
found most often in the context of smallness.! It a ppears to the student that teaching is merely an undesirable task of the faculty. The
university should reward superior teachers on a t least the same scale
as competent researchers. Students realize that a system which consistently drives qualified men away from them does not meet their
need s.

THE C OMPONENTS
Though in the following analysis we will develop the components
of a liberal education separa tely, we understand that in operation each
element exerts influence on all the other components, and is itself
influenced .

1. Th e Student
The fi rst component of a student's education, then, is the student
l . Gaff, D anforth Stud y of the Campus Ministry, a report to the U niversity
of the ·P aci fi c Community, R aymond College, 1965 .

29

himself. The interaction of a student with a college begins during
the selection process and research has shown that different identifiable
environmenta l presses attract equally varied types of students.2 Stud ents pick schools that they think will reinforce their belief systems.3
The obvious importance of the needs and aspirations of the freshman class to the composition of the college is often overlooked due
to the assumption that the new student will fit in.
The student should not be unquestioningly submerged in the
prevailing normative system.
The student body is seen too often as a passive recipient of education, rather than as an active participant in the educational process.
The student culture has four identifiable sub-groups according to
Trow.4
The liberal arts college, while seeking to stimulate the other subcultures, must reinforce the academic sub-culture and increase the
potential of a valuable liberal arts experience.
Due to the efforts of vocational and collegiate sub-cultures to
prostitute the liberal education into a pre-professional training ground ,
increased emphasis on the real purposes of liberal education is
requisite.
liberal education in its true sense is not an education
which you get over with in order to go on to an adult preoccupation with professional academic studies. It is the
source of the ideas and attitudes which infuse the professional studies with their meaning for society and mankind.5

2. Th e Fa culty
The second basic element in any education is the teacher. We feel
that liberal education is most often thwarted at this level. The d istance students sense between themselves and faculty detracts from the
value of student experience.
2.

J.

L. Holland, "Determinants of College C hoice," College and University,
Fa ll 1959.
3. B. R . Clark, College Image a nd Student Selection in Selection and Educational Differen tia tion, Field Service Center and Center for the Study of
Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, California, 1959,
pp. 158-168.
J. M. Richard s, Jr., and J. L . Holla nd, a factor a na lysis of student
"Explanations" of their choice of a college. ACT research reports, No. 8,
Iowa City, Iowa, American College Testing Program, 1965.
E. Silber, G. Coelho, E. Murphy, D . H amburg, L. Pearlin, and M .
R osenberg, "Competent Adolescents Coping with College D ecisions ,"
Archives of General Psychiatry, 5 517-527, 1961.
J. C. Stanley, "A Design for Comparing the Impact of Different Colleges," American Education R esearc h J ournal, 4 217-218, 196 7.
4. Martin Trow, "Student Culture and Administrative Action," in Sutherland
and Others, Personality Factors on College Campus, 1962.
5. Harold Taylor, Students W ithout Teachers, M cGraw-Hill Book C o., New
York, 1969, p. 13.
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Researchers h ave found increased faculty involvement in teaching
undergraduates an important component to quality education.6
The professor involved only in a discipline, no matter how extensive
his knowledge or valuable his research , is a poor teacher. Faculty in
liberal education should re-examine their commitment to teaching in
light of the fact that a liberal education is student-centered rather
than discipline-centered.

3. Curriculum
The curriculum of the institution m anifests one of the important
aspects of faculty influence on students. Systems of required courses
based on classical conceptions of required knowledge restrict students'
freedoms to investigate new areas of interest. Even the most deceptively liberal curricula do not meet student needs, since operational
goals remain unchanged .
K atz and Sanford? find that students neither acquire nor utilize
the knowledge from most of their required general educa tion courses.
In the twentieth century, standardized defini tions of an educated man
h ave become anachronisms. I ndividuals are forced to extract minute
bits of relevant informa tion from their pervasively irrelevant
coursework.
The overriding influence of study in a m ajor field dilutes the exp erience of the liberal education while the pressure of professional
studies in the liberal arts program is philosophically inconsistent.
The curriculum must be flexible enough to accommoda te the needs
of any student in the university so that adequate provision exists for
a student to exercise his intellectual freedom to define what, why,
h ow, when, a nd where he wants to learn. In this fashion the artificial
distinction between academic curriculum and the life of the student
can be partially surmounted, as "curriculum" will designate the
broadest possible spectrum of student activity. A truly educational environment will support many apparently antagonistic elements within it because its various components will be unified around the student.
4. Ph ysical S etting
W e define the physical setting of the college to include all buildings,
facilities and financial resources the college may possess. Since we are
aware of the economic necessity of maintaining existing structures we
will turn our efforts to vital considerations for future construction.
These decisions cannot be based solely on the economics of utility.
Increased utility would be obtained by creating multi-purpose facili6. R . J. Pamos and A. W . Astin, "Attrition Among College Students." ACE
research reports, Vol. 2, No. 4, Office of R esearch, American Council on
Education, Washington, D. C ., 1967.
7. J oseph K a tz, et al., No Time for Y outh, Jossey-Bass, Sa n Francisco, Calif.,
1968, pp. 28-29, p. 422.
N evitt Sa nford , The American College, p . 13.
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ties. There should be no more classrooms! Lounges, living rooms,
dining rooms-anywhere people meet-will serve as classroom space.
Structures incorporating living and learning centers serve to unify the
educational components.
In our definition education is a living experience and we must
therefore consider living quarters to be of paramount importance.
There cannot be any one style of university housing. The student's
residence will serve as the focal point for most of his activities; its
importance in education cannot be overemphasized. The continued
stress by institutions on formal learning centers sustains our present
abortive liberal education system which inhibits curriculum flexibility.
Freedom in the learning experience requires access to the sources
of knowledge. Library collections and functions must be expanded.
Use of computers and other compact fact storage systems should be
implemented. Sharing of facilities by means of advanced technology
will be commonplace. The concept of flexibility in constructing a
physical plant remains of utmost importance. The buildings and facilities can reflect the philosophical commitment of the institution to
individualism in learning.8
We can usually identify the philosophical position of the administration as the institutional posture. As primary interpreters of existing philosophy, upper level administrators are extremely influential
in establishing an education environment9 (Farnsworth 1962 ) . College presidents, provosts and deans for the most part are not primarily
concerned with the education of their students, but rather with the
reputation of the institution, keeping their trustees pacified a nd m aintaining finances in the black. From the student viewpoint only two
aspects of administrative philosophy are consistent: their lack of awareness of students as people and their drive to improve institutional
stature. It becomes apparent that a greater concern for the stature of
individual students is necessary.
One cause of administrative misdirection lies with faculty. The
selfish vested interests of faculty often obstruct meaningful curricular
change. Inaction such as this perpetuates the classical, irrelevant
hierarchy that impedes student development. There seems then, to be
a need for extensive revision in the faculty interpretation of the
philosophy of liberal education before professors can meaningfully
participate in the experience desired.
All environmental components derive their vitality from the
philosophy held by the institution. We have no a rgument with the
goals expressed in many college catalogues. We do take issue with
8. H arold Gores, "The American Campus 1980" in Campus 1980, Alvin
Eurich, editor, Delacorte Press, New York, 1968, pp. 279-298.
9 . Dana Fransworth, "Who Really Helps Our Students?" in Personality
Factors on the College Campus, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1962.
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the current methods of implementation. The environmental components requisite for a liberal education have been structured to deny
the " search for truth," rule out "fresh insights" and stifle the "developing creativity of the individual."
If institutions feel their performance is educationally sound, we
ask them to tell us wh at they are really doing and eliminate the noble
but hollow phrases from their literature.
In conclusion, we feel that the components of a liberal education
are students interacting with faculty, within a curriculum a t a physical locale. The underlying found ation of such a n education rests on
individual responsibility and a definition of liberal education as an
explora tion into what man can know and do . Administrators and
fac ulty must concern themselves with these environmental components
in order to increase potential for p articipants to carry on their own
education .
" Unless these liberal values in education occupy the central
place within the university and in the lives of the undergraduates, a nd from these move into the stream of life a nd of
the full university community, wha t is left is something a
good d eal worse than what now exists-an institution for
producing clever young professionals." 10
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10. H arold Taylor, Students Without Teachers, p . 14.
Samuel D. Johnson-Dan Lago
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PANEL 3

0

DLlo

The Challenge to Make
Undergraduate Curricula Relevant
to Students' Needs
The current crisis which exists in the university is, of course, only
a reflection of the turmoil in the world today. But the situa tion is
exacerbated in the university because in many ways it has stood still
and let the world go by. For this reason, students and faculty must
actively question anew the relationship of the university to society.
It is nothing new to tell you tha t we a re a restless and torn generation. There is nothing novel in the assertion tha t we find ourselves
faced with the inequities of a society which systematically discriminates
against cultural minorities. Nor need I again assert the impa tience of
my generation with an unjust and constitutionally questionable war.
The slogans and activist movements which we embrace in increasing numbers are merely m anifestations of a more fundam ental phenomena which seems elusive both to critics and participants alike.
And the efforts of elder statesmen to fault these symptoms serve only
to underscore the failure of our leaders to comprehend the directions
of young people today.
One m anifestation of this unrest is criticism of the undergraduate
curriculum. Two fac tors inform this criticism: the conflict between
our technological society and an emerging subculture whose m embers
are in the ambiguous position of both accepting the ad vances of our
technological society, while a t the same time professing a fundamental rejection of the implications of technological advance.
Of these two, certainly the la tter is, for m any of us, confusing,
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troubling and even angering. And yet, there is a mystical a nd cohesive
force present in this subculture which intrigues even the most adamant
opponents.
It is intriguing because the movem ent's cry for relevance is founded
on despair- something with which we are all too familiar, and perh aps, therefore, unwilling to heed. But if we probe this despair, we
discover a positive and negative aspect.
It is positive because it asks us if those who teach are speaking
to the condition in which so many students find themselves. The questions of the movement bespeak alienation, concern with this concept
of self, and the possibility for creative expression of the self.
The existential condition of students is frau ght with the implications of our technological society: increased production and increased
dehumanization. Increased production carries with it the translation
of human beings, who are involved in the mechanics of production
into another p art of the machine.
At the same time, there is devaluation of the human being who
is the recipient of the product. H e becomes the object of a mass
operation which is gauged to create a non-existent need on the part
of the consum er. As such, the consumer simply becomes still another
p a rt of a large and m anipulative m achine.
New products are mass produced with little regard for the wellbei ng of the consumer. M ech anisms for greater production fill our air
with pollution. The proponents of this technological advance a rgue
tha t pollution is a necessary by-product of efficiency. Even the most
casually educated student in the field of mechanics understands tha t
pollution is the result of incomplete combustion-or stated in a nother
way, gross inefficiency !
But the most frightening aspect of the technological society is its
impli cation that man should never accept his present condition as it
pertains to personal accoutrements, while a t the same time damning
those who actively question, pa rticula rly in the a rea of social improvem ent. The quest for releva nce is born out of our society in which
frust ration a nd discontinuity are legion. That this query should add ress our present condition with compassion and in depth is a positive
aspect of students' despair we should not overlook.
T he questions which are placed before us are not new, but in their
p resent context, they are startling. The questions are different, however, for they are concentrated not on the "wheres" and "hows," but
rather on the "whys." The "why" question is frightening because it
raises more far-reaching a nd concentrated questions, which frankly
are embarrassing to us. The most fundamental question today is
the " why" that challenges the tacit presuppositions of the American
style of life. The increased requi rement which students sound for
enrolling cultural minorities, for providing centers which feature Afri-
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can and Afro-American culture, and for developing courses which
deal with the urban and Afro-American experience is expressed in
terms of a "why" question.
The underlying question which informs these requests is why our
leaders do not recognize that America's a nd the world's greatest crisis
is the failure of the world's white minority to share power and wealth
with the non-white m ajority.
To those young students who see the war in Viet N am and the
continued systematic oppression of cultural minorities as clear projections of the American Life style, the "why question" h as led to a
fundamental rejection of American profession.
The preoccupation of students today with social causes leads us
to the negative aspect of the cry for relevance.
The cry for relevance has meant too often the necessity for social
involvement, for example, to be institutionally opposed to the war in
Viet N am. For the university to be involved in a political sense is
not only to misunderstand the foundation and function of the university, but is at the same time to erect an unwarranted confinement
about the entire drive for relevance. In order to preserve its freedom,
the university must be a forum for all viewpoints; to adopt any
corporate policy other than tha t assuring the complete intellectual
freedom of the university community is to nega te the rights of individuals to differ .
But students are still critical. Faculties perceive in their criticisms
both an onerous threat and a sense of misery. By only attending that
dimension which constitutes a threat, fac ulties are remiss, for they
both obfuscate and exacerbate the acute agony of our normative
institutions. The fecundity of youth which would breathe exhilaration
into our enterprise we too frequently dismiss because we make their
antagonism so difficult to decipher.
Clearly, then, the cry for relevance takes as its basis the need for
a liberal arts education to address the existential condition of today's
students. The core of this condition is found in the demise of the creative spirit. The church as the traditional forum for spiritual expression no longer stands as a meaningful option for many of my generation. But the dimension of man which is the creative spirit must h ave
a forum on which to express itself, a nd a rash of new alternatives
have presented themselves. Today we find that many students are
involved in sensitivity training, sit-ins, experimentation with drugs,
new m ystical religions and various expressions of the living thea ter.
All of these are attractive precisely because they provide a forum for
spiritual expression and a sense of community.
Of primary importance in this positive aspect of relevance is the
function of these activities: they constitute a fundamental criticism of
the university. The university has failed to address in all dimensions
the concrete situation of man today.
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At the same time, this form of relevance is negative because it
fai ls to comprehend the relation between the spirit of man and his
ability to articulate. The forms to which many students turn today for
creative expression promise a form of fulfillment which can never be
delivered. And the result is an exacerbation of the condition, and a
fundam ental sense of rej ection resulting in stoic indifference.
Nietzsche suggested that the creative fount in the m ake-up of man
(The Dionysian ) could find expression only when in rela tion to the
powers of articula tion (The Apollonian ) . To divorce the spiritual
expression of m an from its concrete a rticulation delivers the sense of
a nti-intellectualism which pervades so m any of our campuses today.
But the power of such a m ovement is the ability to point out that
teaching faculty h ave divorced themselves from the power of the depth
and wonder of existence, and have driven themselves into isolation
with the intellectualisms which no longer speak to the creative spirit of
m a n. And this is p recisely the issue in the call for relevance. The cultu re of which we a re a p art speaks to just this separation of creative
spirit and intellectual a rticula tion .
The challenge for the liberal a rts curriculum rests in the willingness of its leaders a nd teachers to again address the existential condition of which we are a pa rt. W e must be far more willing to probe
the symbolic n atu re of m en, and society, to unearth the dimensions
of ma n for which students crave. W e must address ourselves to the
presupposition of a culture which is in many ways diffe rent from our
own . Liberal arts education must take as its fundamental task the reunion of the creative dimension of m an with his powers of articulation ; to unveil the assumption tha t fear, a nxiety, love and hope a re not
n ew, a nd thereby reveal the eternal, suffering na ture of the human
condition. To examine man's rela tion to himself and society is the
task of good teaching, for it cultivates awareness. This is the awareness for which students h ope.
This development speaks with intriguing sophistication, however,
for it is not the programmed, calculating hope with which our elders
are so familiar because it is an implication of our technological society.
R a ther, it is the hope tha t man will once again resign himself to being
m an, and not a d ynastic m anipula tor; tha t the creative impulse
through the alchemy of commitment will shape new direction ; and
tha t somehow in spite of ourselves, there will be a tomorrow-for no
educated m an can survey the horizon with any surplus of optimism.
Are we prepared as educators to attune ourselves to tha t noble
spirit of m an, which in eloquent simplicity gives order to events, seeks
m eaning in life and gives creation to new hope? Or, indeed, will we
no longer hold out hope for hope ?
D avid S. Pacini
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THE NEED FOR A RECONSTRUCTION OF
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION IN THE HUMANITIES
AND ARTS
Whatever else education may be about, it should be about the
conditions and possibilities of human life. If this proposition is true,
then one would expect that in a college for young adults the humanities
would display a commanding vigor. One might expect a keen responsiveness to the present and the future, a direct and lively concern with
human life in the time ahead, as well as in the past. One might expect
to find questions of meaning and value asked about the lives we lead,
and about the needs, hazards, and opportunities in man's future. One
might even expect the humanities to be concerned directly with the
quality and conditions of human life in the sprawl of urbanism, in the
imagery of m ass communication, in modern politics and war, in
m arket places and factories, in popular as well as high culture.
But it is in these things tha t liberal undergraduate education h as
faltered. The collegiate enterprise, ground between the SA T's of the
secondary school a nd the GRE's of the gradua te school, is not a
significant vehicle for helping young adults consider man's situation
and prospects. As college has become more and more a corridor
between high school and graduate school and an anteroom to the
latter, its program has become preoccupied with the development of
expertise for its own sake. College teachers, in the huma nities or elsewhere, do not h ave much to say about the larger assumptions and
implications of the particular disciplines they advocate and practice.
The liberal arts college itself is in something of the same posture,
dedicated , no matter what the catalog says, to a kind of higher
vocationalism. And it is too much preoccupied by questions of institutional survival, the hierarchical relationships of faculty to each other,
organizational and procedural arrangements. Students know these
things. R adical disaffection or noncommital conformity or rebellious
contempt are not all there is to know about students in our colleges
today. But they suggest that the undergraduate college in America
needs re-examination if we wa nt a more productive relationship between education and questions of man's survival and fulfillment.
Such a relationship cannot be realized by constraining the college
to the functions of a preparatory school for graduate institutions. Nor
can it be accomplished by constraining the humanities to polite
learning in grammar, rhetoric, and poetry, or neo-Alexandrian scholarship in the humanities and arts. For the college-and the humanities
within it- to achieve such a rela tionship two principal needs must
be faced .
The first is for a commitment of liberal education to serve, not
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as a tourist's view of life from the cruise ship, but as an encounter with
con temporary m an's condition. There is a need for the humanities and
arts to be reborn as a central par t of undergraduate education, with
conscious relevance to the actual and potential circumstances of m an's
emerging culture and environment. This is a need for a philosophy of
more than d ay-to-day pragma tic response on the part of the college,
and mo re than fragm ented commitments to the ends and m eans of
the sepa ra te disciplines. Today neither the high school nor the graduate
school, because of their intense preoccupation with special skills and
bodies of knowledge a t their respective levels, function to enable
students to consider themselves a nd their world in human terms.
There is the possibility, then , tha t the undergraduate college might
usefully discover a new place and m eaning for the humanities, h elping undergradua te students to see the whole reach of the human
condition a s well as they can, to ask what it means to be human, to
a sk wha t ou r knowled ge adds up to , to lea rn to reach normative
judgments about individua l and socia l life, and to consider what moral
response a nd action it will take to shape m an's future in ways worthy
of m an. If the college is not to be liquidated by its own inanition, it
needs to say- by its actual program of educa tion rather than by
cata log rhetoric- tha t it is concerned with helping young men and
women learn to be people before they a re professional specialists or
functiona ries.
The second need is for reconstruction of the collegiate program in
terms of such a commitment. In order to bring the student's education
closer to his own experience, we would like to teach him to respect
h is perceptions and d esires and aversions as the stuff out of which
intelligence is m ad e, to lead him to candid expression and a lso to the
acts of discrimina tion a nd discipline necessary to inform expression, to
convince him tha t the p ast is alive in his present and that the future
can be shaped by his intent. W e must devise ways to draw the student's priva te and public worlds nearer to each other, to the end tha t
he may realize self in society. In curriculum, the need is to find
radically creative ways to bring into relationship feeling, thought, and
action about huma n experience, to move beyond the humanities
defined principa lly as schola rly criticism or explication de texte. The
curriculum should make possible a productive interplay between study
and performa nce, inquiry and expression, sense and sensibility, rela ting these to the quality and conditions of life in post-industrial society.
The humanities curriculum should ha ve the intent suggested by D aniel
Bell : "to heighten sensibility ( tha t fusion of intellect a nd feeling ) and
to impart a sense of coherence about human experience- heroism,
pride, love, loneliness, tragedy, confronta tion with d eath." The new
humanities should be founded on the passiona te d esire to know oneself, and in the knowing to know something of all m en. If its curriculum
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is to speak to students, it must, as John Silber puts it, "combine
relevance and rationality; instead of striving to be impersonally objective, we must strive to be objectively personal." There is little of this in
today's undergraduate curriculum. The humanities tend toward
ossification and the lively a rts toward chaos. What is needed are new
curricular patterns that will claim a central position for humane studies
and artistic experience in the education of undergraduates.

A PRINCIPLE FOR RECONSTRUCTION
The two-fold principle that will guide H ampshire's program in
humanities a nd the arts is (a ) that the ends of education should be
as concerned with the quality of the human environment as with
the fullest self-realization of students, and (b) that we can find
radically more effective means than now a re customary for educating
sensibility and helping students to apprehend reality (and affect it )
in coherent and value-informed ways, through combining direct experience with art and life and intellectual inquiry.
At least three concerns of humane education and individual development m ay be accessible through such a proposition. These concerns are rooted in the recognition that experience and inquiry are
inseparable, and tha t the education of humane intellect requires
Arrowsmith's " norma tive judgment" as well as Bruner's "action,
imagery, nota tion. " These concerns are integrity, vocation, and play.
Integrity has the manifest meaning of wholeness. Its service in
the college and the humanities means the admission-into the work of
critical inquiry as well as the work of art-of sensibility and feeling
as well as intellect. It means also a recognition by the student of the
need to accommodate a nd synthesize the many, often contradictory
elements of his own na ture.
If integrity implies an achieved harmony, both together imply
the discovery of vocation . Vocation is intended in its most basic sense,
not to symbolize the antithesis of liberality in education. To seek after
vocation is simply to seek the voice of the inner man, to seek to identify
oneself and one's calling. The college should offer something more
than a fare of alternative styles and the opportunity to explore them
without the demand of premature commitment. The undergraduate
college should offer, too, a n educa tion in which the search for vocation,
in this root sense, is articulated and valued as a primary concern.
Play in many ways is wha t is most disregarded in the humanities
programs of undergraduate colleges. To seek a nd express the processes
of consciousness, to explore that which we value in ourselves, to admit
the practice of the arts to an honored and integral place in the liberal
college curriculum, is to recognize the neglected importance of playof imagina tion or image-making- in human culture and individual
growth. The a ttitudes and moods of pl ay, understood in this sense,
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range from frivolity to ecstasy a nd terror, its practices from the most
mundane mimicry of immedia te surroundings to the poetic rituals by
which the highest realms of the human spirit are reached. The elements
of play, in the words of Huizinga, constitute a t once an aesthetic and
a profoundly natural vocabula ry: "order, tension, movement, change,
solemnity, rh ythm, rapture."
The concerns sketched above can be properly served only if study
about the humanities and arts is complemented by active engagement
with their special vocabularies, their m a terials a nd methods-only if
experience and expression are in active interplay with inquiry. The
arts, in the creative and performing sense, are commonly not thought
of as full y legi tima te and operational compon ents of the humanities
curriculum. The arts within the humanities a re treated most frequen tly
as objects of analytical and verbal study, not as experiences for
one to enter into as a deeply engaged witness or as a huma n being
strivi ng to create or perform.
It is unproductive to view inquiry, experience, a nd expression in
the humanities as na turally separable modes capable of confronta tion
but not integration. A more fully productive view, scarcely attempted
in colleges, is ,to conceive integra tion in terms of collaborative proj ects
or courses developed by practicing artists a nd academic scholars, to
encou rage individual teachers to a ttempt to relate experience in
practice of the a rts with art history and criticism, to cast the critic's role
as emb racing sensibility as well as intellect, to be actively inventive
about ways in which the life of lea rning ca n fuse experiencing a nd
knowing.
It should be added tha t integrity implies an unwillingness to substitute indiscrimina te or merely intense experience for a rt. In encouraging and making provision for practice of the lively arts, freedom of
experience an d expression must be critically and imaginatively sought,
or the uses of art in liberal education are a meaningless charade. But
this liberating potential turns on the realization of a rt as an act ( or
object) of transformation: emerged from the chaos of living, possessed
of its vitality, yet transmuted, endowed with order, form, judgment.
Francis D. Smith
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RETIRING PRESIDENT'S
ADDRESS

'10

A Proposal for a Long-Range
Proj ect for the Association for
General and Liberal Studies
By MALCOLM CORRELL
University of Colorado
Bob Hope is supposed to have said that he always leaves a pa rty
with one or the other of two diam etrically opposed regrets : "Gee, I
wish I hadn't said that!" or "G ee, I wish I had said tha t!" R etiring
from the presidency is a time, of course, for me to assess wha t I h ave
or haven't done as president. The activities of AGLS in the interim
between annual meetings are generally a t such low-key that it would
be difficult to h ave much regret about what we have done. But something has h appened this year and we can all look upon it with some
pride and satisfaction, certainly with no regrets. Through the good
services of Bob Limpus and T ed M arvin, we now have our own
journal-Perspectives. In its formative years the Association rode piggy-back on the Journal of General Education. Tha t journal gave our
members access to a collection of scholarly essays tha t encompass or
at least impinge upon some of our interests. But since JGE a ntedated
AGLS, it had a tradition of purposes and commitments tha t superseded those of AGLS. JGE could not really serve as a house organ
for the Associa tion and we h ad no annals not only to m ake permanent
published record of mundane things like treasurer's reports, m embership lists, and minutes of Executive Committee m eetings but, perhaps
more importantly, to chronicle what hopefully would be the Association's persevering efforts to enhance the vitality of general and liberal
studies. I n Perspectives we have a journal that can serve all these
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needs of AGLS and more. It is a place, of course, for you to submit
appropriate perceptive manuscripts. M ay the muse command you
often and well.
But what of the opposite pole-"Gee, I wish I had said that !"
A retirement marks the p assing or at least the waning of certain kinds
of opportunities. L et me explore this with you not to get you to commiserate with me but to analyze some ways in which AGLS might
go--or perhaps the phrase is "must go." As John Hicks told m e, being
president of a young organization is difficult; by the time you figure
out wha t you ought to be doing, your term is up. Aside from our
annual meetings we h ave no tradition to carry on. The president has
little to run in the sense of keeping a program going. Wha t then is his
role? What is his responsibility to the fledgling organization? It is,
of course, to lead in the definition of pu rpose, to create enterprise
which will become the tradition that moves the organization toward
the ideals which it seeks to fulfill. M y thoughts on these ma tters have
become a crescendo as my term d raws to a close. It would be presumptuous of me, of course, to tell our new president, Hora tio
L af auci, how to do his job. But for wha tever they are worth, I should
like to parade my thoughts before the Association a nd our new presid ent on this occasion. In a sense this is my testimony of regret tha t I
cannot say "This is what we have achieved!" Rather, it's a vision of
what might have been were it not for human frailties. This is the kind
of occasion tha t does not occur often in the life of any man so, with
your indulgence, hear me out.
I think that AGLS ought to h ave a great deal to say to higher education in these troublesome times but the question is what to say. It
is a great paradox of our time that we have more people with bachelor's degrees, more people with higher degrees than ever before and yet
the educated m an is more frustrated tha n ever in his attempts to
understand our neighborhood, our na tion, or our world. The metaphor tha t comes to mind is the hackneyed slogan, "Are you smoking
more now but enjoying it less? Then it's time to change your brand."
Do we need to change our brand of education?
How is it that we can tolerate, seemingly without end, the debilita ting pa radoxes of our time? You can d raw up your own list of
these p aradoxes, but let me give you a few samples.
In a year defined as "peace-time" our defense budget is $80 billion, as much as we spent a t war in 1945, the peak year of World
W a r II. In a year when we have just committed $5 billion to something called "the safe-guard system," we are assured that this is insufficient to bring security and that it will be grossly inadequate before
1975. In a nation which claims to be a democracy of free people,
12 million young men between the crucial ages of 18 to 26 years a re
enslaved by a system which denies them the leisure to contemplate, to
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explore, to inquire, to formulate a life philosophy and to choose
careers which they will find the most rewarding and in which they
will be most effective. In a year when we land men on the moon,
large segments of the American population live in dispiriting despair,
as most of their ancestors have always lived, hobbled by poverty,
disease, hunger, ignorance, unemployment, and a lack of opportunity
to break out of this morass.
These paradoxes are manifesta tions of the collision course on which
our society runs. It's really a double collision course. By ignoring
the physical, spiritual, social, and economic needs of our minority
groups and our poor, to say nothing of our perennial tampering with
the life styles of 12 million young men, is to court trouble. But to pursue defense policies which offer only vaporous hopes, which offer no
ultimate hope of peace and security, is to pursue catastrophe. We, the
people, and our government have not been creative enough to develop
new methods of approaching our problems. We are sterile and impotent in the 20th century when our only response to growing problems is to pour ever-increasing sums of money into the support of
19th century methods.
The university itself is a constellation of paradoxes. At a time
when about 50 % of the college-age young ma triculate into a college,
we find ourselves highly vulnerable to claims of irrelevance. At a time
when we need generalists to comprehend the complexity of social and
political problems, we prod students to commit to a specialty as early
as possible. We need generalists not so much to solve the problems
as to know whose expertise is appropriate. At a time when schol arly
publication is doubling in the decade, we create specialists who cannot intelligently communicate with each other about problems common to us all and who cannot participate in the establishment of programs that may result in solutions. At a time when research is better
supported than ever before, we are not free to direct this support into
channels that would be most helpful to our nation.
Now let me be specific about this last point-the kinds of research
support which we get-for it testifies to the confused purposes of
higher education. In early 1957 the USSR launched the first Sputnik.
Between 1957 and 1959 the moon race was on. We responded during that interval by tripling our research support to universities in the
biological and physical sciences; we quadrupled our support of graduate fellows in the sciences; and we increased our support for improvement of education in the sciences by a factor of 4½ . That this is
indeed a response to Sputnik is implied by the fact that there has
been no comparable step up or down either before or since. But what
is more significant is that we have now been engaged with the Vietnam
problem since 1954, with a truly agonizing involvement dating from
1964. Yet, there h as been no effort, comparable to our response to
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Sputnik, to create a community of specialists on southeast Asia, to
evolve a body of knowledge about its peoples and to improve our
education with respect to knowledge of those peoples. That these a re
not vacuous claims is borne out by reference to a Summa ry of Federal
Funds for R esearch, D evelopment, and R. and D. Plant: Fiscal Y ears
1966, 1967, and 1968. In each year we find that the Federal Governm ent supported basic research in the life sciences, the physical sciences,
and the social sciences. About 50 % of all this research was done in
universities. But the hitch is that the government spent 12 times as
much on life sciences as on social sciences and 27 times as much on
physical sciences as on social sciences. (We are talking here about a
total investment of $4 billion per year in F ederal funds so the amount
going to universi ties was about $2 billion per year. ) If we look a t the
government's support of appli ed research, we find that only about
20 % of this is done in universi ties; perhaps this is as it should be,
but the point is tha t here again we spend 6 times as much for life
sci ence applied research and 20 times as much for physical science applied resea rch as we do for social science applied research. (Again,
the total amount per year is $4 billion so the universities received a
little less than one billion doll ars per year.) Yet, I submit, if we are
to understand people be they black or white, Arab or J ew, Asia tic or
European, capitalist or communist, or just plain American, we must
look to THEIR history, philosophy, religion, sociology, economics; we
must look to THEIR value systems and this includes their a rts, music,
a nd literature as well as the social dimensions of their culture.
On the 15th of O ctober- the Vietnam Moratorium D ay-I used
some of these figures in a speech in Boulder. One of m y esteemed colleagues, a psychologist, said afterward, "Malcolm, you over-estimate
the social scientists. They couldn't spend money like the physicists
even if you gave it to them." The point, of course, is not how much
money we spend but where we put our confidence ; it is rath er what
quality of solution we will demand and how wisely we will support
the investigations tha t lead to such solutions. I think tha t research
in these directions can be a nd must be pursued as vigoro usly as that
in NASA or in its earlier prototype, the Manhattan Proj ect, even if
such research is less costly!
But the hitch is the educated man , be he citizen or a p art of the
government, does not seem to have a compelling vision of quality solutions to our social problems. How then can we m ake such vision be
a part of education? It is here, I believe, that AGLS can define its
role, and a vital one, for the years a head.
Now let me assert forthwith that lack of money is not our fundamental problem. I mentioned earlier tha t the government's expenditure for education in the sciences increased by a factor of 4½ between
1957 and 1959-from $11 million /year to $49 million /year. By 1965
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the amount spent on educa tion in the sciences had increased to $80
million / year and in 1968 it stood a t $75 million /year. Yet, in 1968
my physicist colleague, Professor H . R. Crane of the University of
Michigan says:
"You m ay now ask, reasonably : H asn't a great deal been going on
in the way of curriculum development and improvement of teaching
ma terials? Are we not m aking progress ? I will answer that this h as
simply not led to the breakthrough tha t is needed in regard to the
noncalculus group. The effort has mainly been directed a t the physics
m ajor. W e have become very sophisticated a nd the physics m ajor on
a given birthday is probably a year ahead of where his predecessor
used to be 20 years ago. T each ing fo r the noncalculus student supposedly has ridden the coa ttails of this development, and h as sha red
in its riches. If the inference is tha t this spill-over is solving the noncalculus teaching problem , I must strongly disagree. There has been
one fatal error in logic : Through it all we h ave clung for dear life
to the maxim tha t what is good training for a future physicist is good
for anybody who takes physics. Consequ ently the noncalculus captive
sees, to his dismay, that the aim of the course is to train him (a) to
solve physics problems, and (b ) to think and act like a physicist, i.e.,
the instructor. His desire for either of these could not possibly be
less." 1
In Crane's view, then, even the m assive curriculum revision
projects, at least those in physics, have not served the purposes of
education as something distinct from training in the specialty. C rane's
criticism shares a common them e with the views of other critics. For
example, Joseph Schwab2 and H arold T aylor3 each would agree,
broadly if not in detail, that most of the courses which a re offe red
for the generalizing or liberalizing dimension of educa tion, or as distribution requirements, do not sta rt with the general student in mind
but, as Crane says, presuppose that what is good for the specialist is
good for anybody seeking some exposure to the subj ect. Schwab uses
an interesting phrase to describe where such courses come out when he
calls them a "rhetoric of conclusions."4
These criticisms are not new in kind, of course ; they have been
extensively expounded for several d ecades a nd most of us a re famili ar
with their content. To us in AGLS, as we seek to determine how best
we can serve the cause of general and liberal studies, it will be much
1. H. R . Crane, "Students Do Not Think Physics is 'Releva nt.' Wha t C an W e
Do About It?" Am. J. Phys. 36, 11 37, (1 968) .
2. Joseph J. Schwab, College Curriculum and Student Protest, The University
of Chica go Press, Chicago, 1969.
3. H arold T aylor, Students W ithout T each ers: The Crisis in th e Univ ersity,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969.
4. Ibid ., p. 19.
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more useful for us to look long and hard at what Schwab, Taylor,
Crane and others propose to do in response to their own criticisms.
It is in teaching ourselves to apply these remedies that I believe our
association might locate its first long-term program.
You can get a glimmer of what I m ean by a quick reading of
two sections of Schwab's book, one section called "Principles of Enquiry" and the other "Arts of Enquiry."5 I can only highlight these
here by a few well chosen quota tions:

" ... In all fields ... systematic enquiries begin in principles
of enquiry, guiding conceptions of the subject m atter which determine what questions to put to it, what data are relevant to
its solution, what these data indicate."
" In the biological and physical sciences, the involvement of
p rinciples of enquiry as the ground on investigation only occasionally gives rise to the existence of pluralities of answers to
questions, because these sciences have long since adopted the
h abit of obtaining a consensus of principles within the field.
Most practitioners of most such sciences use the same principle
of enquiry within a given era of research , changing or replacing
it when it ceases to be useful, but doing so mainly in concert."
"Most of the social sciences, on the other h and, are in the
condition of ecology. Numerous conceptions of community,
society, culture, personality, learning ... exist. None is seen by
a substantial ma jority of the concerned scientific community to
exceed other conceptions in both reliability and comprehensiveness . . . (therefore) diversities of view and pluralities of knowledge arise."
" . .. (Th ese) diversities of knowledge ... often appear to
the reader as competing answers to precisely the same question.
In fact, they a re a nswers to somewhat different or radically
different questions. In consequence, they are not so much competitive as complementary."
"The curriculum ( which m akes good use of the principles of
enquiry) can put such m aterials, facilities, occasions, and invitations in the way of the student that he is moved and enabled to
pursue enquiries in his own right: focus on a n interest of his
own, shape a problem concerning it, search out m a terials, choose
his methods, apply them, formulate the products of his enquiry."
Schwab then p ays some homage to the bachelor's thesis as an enterprise that may pursue just such enquiry, but stresses that this misses
his point. H e says with that:
5. Ib id., pp. 83-94.
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"If we are to consider engagement in enquiry as a curricular
resource, ... the respectability of the product is not the point,
and its production should not wait on developed competences
but, on the contrary, (should) be the means for their
development ." (Italics are mine.)
So Schwab's remedy for some of the ills of education is, in part, to
build teaching around enquiry.
I think Crane would agree with this. He casts his remedy into the
context of physics6, of course, but what he says can be applied in any
field.
Let me try to summarize. Crane prescribes his medicines under
eight different headings only two of which I shall touch-communication and sequentialness.
First, the students come with a highly developed language of their
own. If we insist on making distinctions-e.g., force and energywhose difference the student has not yet seen, the student is confused.
Crane says, "It would be fine if we could start at the beginning of the
course discussing physics in their language and gradually convert to
ours by the end of the course. Instead, we feel that we have to start
right off using ours." The reaction of the student then becomes parrot like and communication is lost. Crane cautions, too, against
the early use of abstractions and the intonations of absolute truths
that are also blocks to communication. The appreciation of the worth
of abstractions is something that grows slowly. And to cite conservation
of energy to dampen a student's enthusiasm for a proposed perpetual
motion device may be interpreted as evidence of a closed mind that
doesn't know a break-through when it sees one. All of these thingsthe recognition of differences, the need for distinctive terms, the value
of abstraction, absolute truth-all these things emerge from enquiry
and they can never be appreciated nor understood by one who has
never participated in disciplined enquiry.
Concerning sequentialness Crane points out that nowhere in ordinary life do we have all the necessary principles, laws, derivations, and
formulas before we encounter the problem. Why then should a course
be highly sequential? Here, too, he is suggesting, I think, that enquiry
as a mode of instruction can be a more valuable approach.
Now the old cliche that we teach as we were taught is all too
patently true. Even if we are persuaded that enquiry is a more viable
method of instruction I doubt that many of us-given our backgrounds, academic climates, existing materials, etc.-I doubt that many
of us can teach in that manner. What we need, it seems to me, is
an intra-professional effort to develop our skills. I propose then that
we seek ways to conduct some experimental conferences or workshops
6. Ibid., p. 1139 ff.
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which will have such a redirection of teaching as their aim. Hopefully,
we could set a pattern which might ultimately provide such conferences at the intra-campus level.
Somehow, it seems to me, improvement of teaching has to come
through self-education of faculty. The vicious circle represented by
we-teach-as-we-were-taught gives us no grounds for hope of improvement by the mere passing of one generation and the coming of the
next. So if the vicious circle must be broken from within, then perhaps
AGLS can find a way to strike the first blow.
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Science and Social Relevance
BY GERALD HOLTON

I was very flattered to be asked here by your Association to the
beautiful campus of Colgate University. Particular thanks should be
offered to my good friend, Dr. Henshaw, who has here been holding
the flag high for General Education in the sciences. I know this is
not a very easy task. That he has done it so well is a measure of both
the place and the man.
Having struggled myself with various experiments in G eneral
Education over the years, what I'd like to talk about today are not
any of the successes but rather some of the problems, particularly
the problems that I see coming to us faster and faster in this business
of bringing education in science to students who, many of them, are
turning away from science and all it stands for.
I heard a story once from Noel Baker about Sir Thomas Beecham,
a story that seems to me to touch on the kind of irreconcilable hostility we sometimes have to deal with in our own work as instructors.
Sir Thomas used to travel first-class, of course, and in the nonsmokers'
compartment of the railway. He could not stand smoke. One day a
very expensive lad y entered the compartment, and sure enough, she
pulled out her cigarette case and offered it to Sir Thomas. Irascible as
he was, he shouted, "Don't you know it's a nonsmoker?" "Yes," she
says, "but I do like to smoke." He answered, "Madam, if you smoke,
I shall throw up." This outraged her; she pulled herself up and said,
"How dare you use such language to me? I have some influence on
this line. I am one of the directors' wives." To which Sir Thomas:
"Madam, even if you were the only wife of the director, I would still
throw up."
I feel we are beginning to see some students who are in tha t
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pos1t10n when it comes to science instruction. No matter what we
offer them , they a re likely to reject it forcibly. Some of you here
today a re not scientists, so you might perhaps be tempted for a mom ent to take a certain sa tisfac tion in having it happen to those overly
successful scientists ; but m y fear is tha t wha t is going on now is a
p recursor of something tha t'll come to all our various subjects.
L et us first look at the meanings of science. There is Francis
Bacon's remark: Science should be pursued for the glory of God and
for the relief of m an's esta te. But tha t slogan is very solipsistic. One's
own gods, one's own estate. A century earlier the same slogan h ad
been the ba ttle cry for Piza rro and Cortez, for murdering right and
left and plundering a continent. Science too can be carried on in the
m anner tha t colonization was carried on, and so some of our students
invite us to examine the slogan instead of accepting it blindly.
There a re other views, too. I sha re the belief tha t science should
be considered a central pa rt of our cultu ral heritage and that this
must be brought across to our students, p articula rly in a General
Education course. In addition, science is of course also the personal
activity of real people, a nd so we should also take care to stress that
science is a style of life, with its own ethos, with its own intellectual
and social rewards, with its own excitement ; after all, tha t's what
keeps us in science in the first place. Somehow we don't share this
sufficiently with our students, sometimes not even with our graduate
students. No wonder tha t from the outside it sometimes appears that
science is an entertainment for a few.
To turn to two aspects which I'd like to treat in some detail later,
science can be seen as a study in which many different a reas of human
thought are unified in a striking way; and, on the other hand, science
can be considered a mirror of society, for good or ill: the mirror of
a society which treasures m erit as a chief criterion of democratic
process, but which also has dedicated itself with singula r skill to
violence. I thought the rem arks of the retiring president of your
Associa tion this evening very much to that point (see p age 42-Ed.) .
Let me go back to Bacon' s definition , which only echoes a more
ancient one, that of Pla to, one that I've found perhaps the most
insightful way of putting tha t view of science. In Book Seven of Th e
R epublic, Socrates lcmd Glaucon a re talking. They' re not really discussing. G laucon just says "yes" and " no" as usual, since this was in the
days befo re real dialogue a nd the like; teaching was more of a linear,
unidirectional process. Socrates explains why a young ruler in the
ideal sta te should study mathematics or, by implication, any science
at all. This knowledge has a double use : milita ry and philosophical.
The student will someday become a m an of wa r, and the man of
wa r m ust learn the art of numbers or he will not know how to a rrange
his troops. And as a philosopher he must also learn ma thematics
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because in this way he can rise out of the sea of change and lay hold
of true being as reflected in the certainty of mathematical knowledge,
which would be the easy way for the soul to pass from becoming to
truth and to being. This is the double mission, then, of science: to
help you serve the state, and to help you serve your soul.
La ter in The Laws, Book Twelve, Pla to raises again these arguments for the study of science by the future ruler or m agistrate. One
motive for believing in the divine is the perception of orderliness in
the motion of planets and other bodies, "swayed by the Mind tha t
has set this whole frame of things in comely array." In this light, the
study of astronomy is an antidote for a theism, for there is "aroused
in the breast of close students the suspicion, which has now been
converted into accepted doctrine, tha t, were the planets without souls,
and by consequence without intelligence, they would never h ave conformed to such precise computations. So the prime purpose of astronomy is not, let's say, the detailed study of the precession of the
equinox, upon which the Platonist heaps scorn, but ra ther it is moral
philosophy. That's the social relevance of astronomy in Pla to's
thought: it conduces to the moral education of the young.
I think you see the point I'm hinting at. There is a danger that
today we may fall into a similar trap. Nam ely, we m ay foster the
study of science, not chiefly for its own sake, but chiefly for the sake
of its possible social relevance, though to be sure, of a kind different
than in Plato's day. The very word science nowadays seems to bring
to mind a set of problems such as the conflicts between the needs of
science a nd the priorities and processes of government: the arms race,
the role of science in helping to clean up pollution, and the like.
Now, as you will see, I shall want to t ake this point of view very
seriously, and it is an important component of teaching science. I
shall presently make a model for this science-society interrela tion, and
use the model to lea rn something about science instruction. But after
I get done with it, there is another of the aspects of science and social
relevance, one tha t rarely gets into science texts. For a work of science
sometimes is also a way to exhibit and measure much that is valuable
in human thought quite outside science itself, just as, conversely, the
enthusiastic involvement of some scientists-not many, but enough on
both sides of the Iron Curtain- in continuing to escalate the arms
race in this age of overkill is one aspect of societies unable to pursue
sane ways of na tional and interna tional life. So science is a kind of
thermometer, one that measures the health and sickness of our times.
And the same, incidentally, might be said of all scholarship. This is
why I believe if the stand is not m ade firmly enough in the sciences,
eventually anti-intellectualism will be sweeping that much more easily
through the other fields as well. The downturn in basic research
money, the a ttack on the Foundations, the dropping of many na tional
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educational programs, the blacklisting of good scientists, the drafting
of gradua te students, even the way in which the Apollo program has
put its own basic scientific research on the back burner-these are
all straws in the wind, and I believe they a re not simply anti-science.
H ere is something which your Association might well study. The educational institutions as a whole a re of course under attack from Right
and Left. Some of the young rebels think, a nd to a degree they are
right, tha t educational policy tends to be set primarily not by our
d esire to pursue truth, but by the function of schools to provide
human resources for industrial and military institutions. H ence they
attack " the system" at the place closest a t hand, namely, their own
school. Little do they see that their tactics in many cases merely
reinforce the anti-intellectualism and a nti-humanism which plague the
system in the first place.
Now let me examine one part of Plato's and Bacon's double
definition a bit more: science as socially relevant power. The academic
usually prefers to keep this aspect out of his class discussion, a nd
treats science as if it were a subj ect in a sealed box without inputs
and outputs-the way a few of m y fri ends in the humanities seem to
think of Shakespeare as a book on a shelf, not associated with the
living performance of the play. And indeed the academic is likely
to be self-selected from tha t part of the population that likes to narrow
down big problems, and is good a t doing it this way. M any problems
do yield to this kind of an attack, and one's subject is also easier to
teach in reductionist terms. But no sooner do we really try to do any
science than we see that scientific work is part of a ch ain of activities
that stretches outside the lab a nd the present, a chain crudely indicated
by the symbols [SCIENCE]+[TECHNOLOGY}+[SOCIETY]->[SCIENCE]->- [TECHNOLOGY], etc. We are of course not in an
hermetically sealed box tha t contains just our friends and our lab and
our students. We are more like circuit elements in a complex network in
which information and energy flow in and flow out. Examples from the
history of science come to mind immedia tely. Think of how Faraday's
work in electromagnetism was followed by motors and generators, much
appreciated and used by society a t large. As soon as Faraday's work was
incorporated into technological advances, things could happen which
neither a Faraday nor an Edison could h ave predicted. For example,
there was a rapid expansion in the scale of cities because of increase
in the transportation capabilities, both horizontally, by streetcars, and
vertically, by elevators. The city's shape was affected within a few
decades by the technological potential of Faraday's first little toy.
Or think of using this simple chain-like model on the consequences
of the work of Fermi and his group in Rome, who discovered by
accident slow neutron fission without even knowing it for some years.
They found a remarkable effect which, a decade la ter, with Los
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Alamos, is found to be a t the base of the technology of nuclea r weapons. Their use in wa r, of course, was determined by the forces of
societies in conflict. And then on again to the effect upon science
itself, through the extraordinary force feeding of nuclear physics and
nuclear engineering after the war. And then follows yet another a rrow
to Society, in the sense that soon half of the wattage of newly-built
electric power plants will come from nuclear power. Such examples
can be repea ted again and again. But one rarely talks about it in our
science classes.
I'd like to m ake a few comments about this linear, " classical"
model of the relation between science and society. First of all, of
course, it' s oversimplified ; the idea that science, or society, can be represented by a box. Moreover, the words a re catch phrases. Science and
technology a re often difficult to separate, and often a re sequentially interlocked- [SCIENCE]-HTECHNOLOGY]+[SCIENCE]+[TECHNOLOGY]-as in a loop . Thus an adva nce in solid-sta te physics p ermits m aking instruments that allow you to m ake very much faster
measurements which allow you to solve scientific research problems
involving a timescale that was previously not reachable, and so forth.
Another obvious point is that each of these operators or elements,
particularly the arrow, is one of considerable complexity. These things
don't h appen by themselves. Los Alamos did not suddenly appear in
order to reap the benefi ts of Fermi's, H ahn and Strassm ann's, M eitner
a nd Frisch's discoveries. General Electric did not just m a terialize at
the end of an a rrow leading from pure aerodynamics to the supersonic transport plane, which will cost the na tion a n estimated $5 .3
billion dolla rs before the first production model will fly. There were
people who were quite busy to make it all happen , who shaped the
arrow and pointed it in a direction pleasing to them.
And this is just the place where there is a breakdown of the
classical laissez-faire scheme-where there is supposed to be a sufficient diversity of motives and a free competition of moderately-sized
groups, so that the net result is a kind of accommodation or general
consensus that leads society on as if guided by some unseen hand, one
tha t never favors one interest group excessively a t the cost of the
others. Now a few gigantic force concentrations come into play, of a
kind that would have frightened Adam Smith.
Edison was of course a powerful m an ; when he wanted to have
his pa rticular kind of generating plant at Niagara Falls, he went a t it
with all the fierceness of a modern lobbyist. But he was peanuts comp a red to the kind of mobilization now routinely imposing its corporate
will upon the popula tion. Think again of the SST, for example, where
virtually all the independent scientific ad vice has been negative-and
now we are m ade to have it anyway. Think of the use of herbicides
and defoliants in Vietnam, where in 1961 a small first test was m ade

54

by the D.O.D. of the effectiveness of certain defoliants on small strips
of land, about a hundred feet wide on each side of a highway. It
worked there-and then was immensely escalated. H alf a million
acres at a time h ave been sprayed. The ecological consequences in this
climate have never been checked out, nor what happens to people who
routinely have to ingest the stuff. These are examples ofa step-function
change injected into the science-technology-society chain, when a
m any-order-of-magnitude change is imposed on the landscape, a substantial part of the planet being affected very suddenly by the decision
of a very few without attention being paid even to the scientific community to check sufficiently wha t the ecological or medical consequences might well be. It's precisely here that trouble a rises in the
rela tion of science and society. When the direction of the arrow from
one to the other is not the vector sum of many manageably small
impulses-something near to, but better than, random walk-that
di rection can be subject to flip-flop oscillation. As a circuit engineer
would put it by analogy, it is a n unstable system.
There is a nother reason why the system I h ave sketched now is
unlikely naturally to follow the will of the m ajority in the usual
democratic process. The time span h as become shorter a nd shorter
between a scientific adva nce, the p erfection of its possibility for
technological exploitation, and the adoption of this development by
the consumer at large. Comparing the F araday story and the F ermi
story shows tha t the time lag between scientific innovation and widespread adoption of technical devices used to be of the order of thirty
to fifty years in the 19th century, long enough for some kind of social
consensus to be brought to bear on the process itself. But it was down
to fifteen years in the Fermi case, and has been fu rther shrinking since.
The NSF h as recently released an in-house stud y of the time sequence
between fundamental research and technological research or, as they
call it, nonmission research a nd mission research. The report is called
T races and contains examples, from the birth control pill to video
tape recorders, showing where the fundamental scientific and technical ad vances were in each case. The time delay is no longer thirty
to fifty years, but now more on the order of ten years, a nd I believe
in some fields it is down to five years or less. That was true of the
time elapsed between the design of the fi rst nose cone of an American
missile a nd the time the actual used object, after being fired on the test
range, turned up at the door of the Smithsonian to be put on public
exhibit. I believe there must be a n atu ral lower limit for transforming
a basic scientific advance into innovative technology-something like
three years, for this is about the time it takes for a bright graduate
student to get his doctorate in engineering. If the metabolism gets
faster than that, he will be out of da te before his own doctorate thesis
has been finished.
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Let us hope the metabolism will not get more rapid tha n tha t.
But in the present system of imposing decisions with large-scale consequences, it is even now far too rapid for calm assessment of the
usefulness a nd dangers of technology by a wide enough portion of the
informed citizenry. L arge scale modifications of national life and
n ational priorities are made before the wisdom of the priorities, the
commitment and its direction and opportunity costs have been sufficiently scrutinized. (The manned space program is an example.)
Moreover, m any of the attempts at technology assessment are not
made where the public can enter a t all, but behind a screen of confidentiality, even where n ational security is not involved. (To test this,
try to get hold of the va rious official reports in the SST case.) As
Oppenheimer once said, the trouble with secrecy in debates on technical matters is tha t truth itself is unlikely to flourish except in the
milieu created by open a nd free discussion.
In terms of our model, therefore, when the time-scale aspect of
the a rrows between the " boxes" gets so short, when the interested
p arties can keep discussion from flourishing and can push the arrow to
point in the direction of interest to them, and when order-of-m agnitude
changes are injected in the system, then the system can indeed become
unstable. A circuit engineer would immediately know what is needed
to stabilize it- namely, feedback loops. This means one must first try
out on a small and open test scale wha t the result of the introduction
of a technological decision is, particula rly if it is intended to be m ade
eventually on a large scale, and more p articularly if this is intended
by powerful, interested parties. Then the test results must be fed back
through the boxes to modify the innova tion and the decision to deploy
as needed .
For example, the food industry apparently h as h ad it in its power
to put some 680 additives on the approved list so far without detailed
checking; the Food and Drug Administration calls them Generally
Regarded As Safe (GRAS ). (I've always thought, who is this General
who regards it as safe? It must be General Foods or General Mills.)
We are now beginning to see the need to inject a probe into the
output end of the food technology box to test more carefully, over a
longer time span, whether indeed the proposed la rge-arrow injection
into society will be generally safe. As Sena tor McGovern said recently,
instead of the GRAS list we need a PAS list- Proven As Safe-for
all food additives and drugs, and, in my own view, also for any technological device or, for tha t m atter, any large-scale educa tional
experiment. Until it passes extensive tests, the device or innova tion
should be clea rly labeled as bearing the onus of being untested and
perhaps unsafe. So my suggestion is that between these boxes there
ought to be a pass-inspection requirement to see whether in fact the
total spectrum of main and side effects is such as to leave the system
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in equilibrium and provide social benefits as judged on widely acceptable grounds.
Now here is exactly where, in a new way, science as a profession
and science teaching come in. Such an examination system will require
detailed scientific work. There are at present very few people employed
in this kind of profession, namely the scientific assessor who can make
these d elicate, difficult tests of the outputs of technology to find out
whether the effects are in fact tolerable. Moreover, there may be a
great deal of resistance against going into that kind of socially relevant scientific activity. Yet, it seems to me that it will have to come
soon, if science is to remain in good repute. No matter how pure,
subtle, sophisticated, and beautiful the subject may be to us as we
pursue it in that box of our own, under the present system of motivations the leakage out of tha t box into the next ones, into technology
and then into society, will increasingly befoul the reputation of all,
even the purest sciences, unless there is some scientific assessment or
pass-inspection introduced routinely into the system.
I find that a few engineers, and also some "pure" scientists, are
beginning to think along these lines. At MIT there are groups of
faculty members who have begun to look for funds and set up laboratories for this purpose of assessment. But such labs will have another
purpose also, and this introduces a n additional point of importance
that is not widely appreciated. M any of the m ajor problems facing
society as a by-product of technological advance cannot be cured or
even properly understood unless some new scientific advances are
made. This gives a whole new m anda te and a whole new range of
expectations for basic research in science. For example, the problem
of overpopulation is to some degree due to scientific ignorance of the
basic processes of conception and of hormonal action. Population
control is still waiting for ad vances in pure science. Arms control
treaties are to some degree less likely because of areas of ignorance
in geophysics that are, for example, making inspection by seismic means
difficult. Bringing food to hungry people in desert areas near the sea,
as in Peru and Egypt, is mostly a political problem, as so many are,
but to some degree also a problem of basic science: not until we
have more fundamental knowledge about the structure of liquids or
the transport phenomena in membranes will we have really cheap desalination plants. And, for that matter, we need to know more about
the basic metabolism of plants to see how one might grow food plants
in saline water. Pollution is a m atter of greed and stupidity, lack of
law enforcement and apathy. But to clean up smog-ridden areas it is
also necessary to know far more about basic processes in combustion
chemistry. Scientific advances in such areas will allow us to feed
scientific information into the technological box so that the next output does not need to be that ha rmful.
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When our students ask about the social relevance of science, I
believe they want to see, first of all, the model as a whole a nd how
it works in specific cases, and secondly, they would like to be reassured that their teachers, or those people whom their teachers respect
as scientists, do not all want their work to be carried on only within
closed little boxes, but tha t some of them also, at least from time to
time, act as monitors, inspectors, assessors in the feedback-loop p art
of the more d ynamic or cybernetic model I have proposed.
I have no doubt that in the long run our students, our colleagues,
our congressmen, and the public a t large will have to get used to this
ecological way of thinking about the process of science as it connects
with society, and to judge the relevance of science a t least in pa rt in
terms of the essential need to have science come to the rescue of the
system. I see no other way in which it can possibly be stabilizing
itself. A hopeful, perhaps even hea rtwarming evidence tha t thi s type
of talk is not only talk is what h as lately been ha ppening a t the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. The AAAS is,
so to speak, the intellectual trade union of scientists across the board
with about 130,000 members. For some time m embers of the Boa rd of
the AAAS have looked at ways of re-dedicating their society to its
original charter purpose, announced over a century ago, namely to
further the pursuit of science for human welfa re. W e have identified
ten main problems in human welfare, ranging from hunger and m alnutrition, population pressure, the quali ty of life and the like to an
understanding of science itself, a nd we have dedicated ourselves
strongly to a n enla rgement of our purpose, effectiveness, and audience.
One hopes that one can gather up a good pa rt of the nea rly one
million scientists and engineers in this country to obtain the widest
possible base on which a good fraction of them, at least part of their
time, in consulting or otherwise, will involve themselves in the conscious and specific pursuit of science for human welfare-not to the
exclusion of science for its own sake, but as a safeguard for its beneficent survival.
Now let us leave the aspect of science as power- not m erely
power to array your troops, but, better yet, power to inspect a nd
enforce a treaty that avoids arraying troops-and let us go a t least
very briefly to the second part of Pla to's double definitio n: science as
pure thought, and hence as education of the soul. Here, too, our
model is of some use, for there are input a rrows into the science "box"
tha t come from outside science itself. Faraday did not invent his
electromagnetism out of thin air. R ather, he was prompted by an
interest in Natur Philosophie, a movement which counts Goethe
as its most prominent propagandist, and which to this day has quite
a n appeal to some. It is a philosophy that looks for la rge, overarching
h armonies and unities among all fields of thought. Faraday was much
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caught up with this, and his search in physics for an effect which
showed that electricity and magnetism a re not two unrelated parts
of science was a way of doing experimental philosophy.
Something like it was true for Newton, a devoted student of the
metaphysician Henry More, whose teachings Newton echoes in his
sections on the nature of time a nd space in the Principia. Again,
Einstein's impulse towa rd relativity did not come from trying to solve
some piddling problem in physics. R ather, a t the beginning, Einstein
was deeply under the influence of the kind of neopositivism that is
most closely identified with Ernst M ach, and to him the main task
was to find a new way of looking a t space and time so that it fulfilled the operational criteria of meaning. At the beginning of the
relativity paper of 1905, tha t's what you find as the important message. The kinematics is prefaced by definitions of space and time,
just as Newton, too, wanted first of all to get straight the meaning of
space and time, working with ideas he had first heard from a philosopher. The point I'm trying to make is that when science is done
at its best-and I hope tha t in each of our courses this is the main
purpose, to show our students science at its best through the work of
a Faraday, a Newton, a n Einstein- it goes beyond its narrow confines
and encompasses and illumina tes the whole structure of thought of
the time.
One could proliferate examples of this sort, none more intriguing
tha n the case of Niels Bohr. When Niels Bohr fi rst got into physics,
the rath er comfortable notion held sway tha t there is an independent
world out there towa rd which we, as if on the other side of some
moving frontier, relentlessly progress in the unfolding of scientific
knowledge. A key idea was the independence of the observer from the
physical process which he studies. For example, in the study of a
moving object, a billia rd ball if you will, the path is apparently not
influenced by the fact that you're looking a t it. The assumption is
tha t your act of shining light from this moving ball will not disturb,
or couple to, the motion of this ba ll, but leave it uncha nged . And the
same assumption was made throughout physics. But by 1927 it became clear to Niels Bohr that this ancien t principle of decoupling
between the observer and the observed prevented one from understanding wha t was going on in quantum mechanics.
For example, depending on how you set up the experiment, depending on what the observer decides to look a t, he can see one
aspect of light or the other, either the wave or the pa rticle aspect.
Bohr realized it is futile to t ry to reduce the one to the other, to
dissolve these antithetical ways of thinking about the phenomena of
light. Our knowledge of light is really the su perposition of the evid ence of different kinds of experiments, in which we behave differently,
our gadgets are different, what we look at is different ; and it is the
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layer cake of all those experimental reports, some of which appear to
be contradictory to each other, which defines "light."
Now to deal in this way with apparently contradictory ideas, and
to regard them as complementary, was something for which physics
h ad not been prepared at all. Where did Bohr get this idea? H e never
was very successful in expressing himself on this point, but he gave
hints throughout his life. W e now know that in his youth Niels Bohr,
the son of the physiologist Christian Bohr, was allowed to sit in on
the shop club on philosophical topics which his fat her ran, and that
he was profoundly influenced both by this experience and by Christian
Bohr's own complementa ristic way of thinking about biology-accepting the merits of physicalistic reductionism without entirely denying
the m erits also of vitalistic ideas. A number of scholars h ave studied
the possibilities of other early influences on Bohr, including L. Rosenfeld, K. M ayer-Abich, M . J ammer, and T. S. Kuhn. The details h ave
not yet been fully sorted out, but there are tantalizing cues that Bohr
was much attracted to the writings of Kierkegaard, William J ames,
and H0ffding who, in different ways, were struggling with aspects of
complementarity in psychology and philosophy. What we discover, in
other words, is tha t the most recent of the really great new ideas in
physics of our time, which was the complementarity principle, may
well have been t riggered not a t all just by somethi ng present in a box
called physics, but by something which came from the outside, from
humanistic studies among others.
I must now end because I know tha t both your patience and the
tape recorder will be exhausted. But I should summarize the implications of these points for the teaching of science. At the top I would
put the need to teach the most important ideas of science themselves.
One must respect science still above all on its own terms. That's the
bulwark agai nst an anti-intellectualism tha t could be sweeping through
this and all other fields. Yielding to uninformed pressures to concentrate on something "interesting" puts you on a slippery slope that
can quickly lead to astrology and ESP. The subject matter of science
has to be our anchor, and indeed I think the best students would be
feeling cheated most if one didn't make the subject m atter very
central.
But we must also show how the important ideas cam e into being.
When you do this seriously you may discover that you need the help
not just of your physics colleagues but also your other colleagues,
whether they be philosophers, psychologists, or historians. To discuss
adequately major contributions to science such as those I have mentioned today, particularly in a class containing man y non-scientists, it
is in my view necessary to show the input from the humanities as well.
That kind of a relevance, namely the scientific ad vance as the culminating point of a whole movement of ideas from various fields, is
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one which helps to do justice to the dignity of our enterprise.
Teaching science humanistically means showing the inputs from,
and outputs to, many other fields. I appreciate that some do not feel
entirely competent to teach it this way, and certainly I often feel that
way myself. But that is what the idea of academia is all about: we
have colleagues with whom to consult, a nd that will bring us together with them a bit more ; and with our students, we can make
it frankly a joint exploration of something to be newly learned by the
students together with us.
Seeing science clearly requires that we locate it properly in a
social matrix of action, which means tha t we have to have some
adequate cybernetic model. This can direct the attention of our students to those places within the model where they, if particularly
interested in releva nt activity, can play their own part; even if they
don't become scientists, they can have roles as monitors and consumers
of science-alert to scientific events and social consequences.
L ast but not least, if science is a style of life, we ought to get
our students to share that style of life with us. I am afraid this does
mean more personal interaction, more time spent, than many of us
are in the habit of allowing except for graduate students or postdoctorates. And they should share in more than just the life of the
lab, but also in your other concerns, to get the widest view of your
activities as a scientist and citizen-not to be locked up in a lab, but
to go out, say to the meetings of the societies, including AAAS or
SSRS or PAS, to meetings where scientists debate how, to some degree,
to ta ke a valid part in shaping the destiny of society. We might well
somehow adopt a few apt students, and let them intellectually live
with us, not only when we are thinking about physics or chemistry or
biology, but also when we are thinking about their applications or
other consequences, when we act as consultants or feel upset about
the abuse of science and write to our congressman, or when we go to
meetings to which we might well bring a younger counterpart to
listen and to debate on what it is that animates and excites us. In
this way we shall, I think, do justice to science in the many, splendid
meanings of the word.
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Science as a Liberal Study
" I S I T WORTH A ROSE I N A DUNG H EAP?"
" . . . I search for their lost faces
in a field of broken mirrors and find
only my eyes shattered
as usual vacant as usual
a nd all this time the dead
know wha t they a re doing
and come out with diplomas of silence .. ."
R ichard Sh eldon
"Only the disciplined mind can be creative," is a phrase used by
many of the traditional academicians in the wake of charges by today's
angry and vocal youth. Some educators do not recognize tha t creativity, per se, is not totally dependent on the n ature of the disciplinary
training but rather, it is the product of the creative act, which up
until now has avoided logical analysis. M a ny educators recognize tha t,
although elements ( fac ts, etc.) are needed in order to express or
create, these things alone are not enough . Since connections of the
mind are probably made from some sources of discipline, the phrase,
in and of itself, expresses some truth. However, this facile phrase is
too often used to mean the instructor who knows the substance of his
discipline extremely well, can use tha t substance, a nd that alone, to
educate his students. The danger in this kind of pedagogy is that no
science is entire of itself. I t would be facetious of me to deny that
many creative students came out of a strict disciplinary a pproach to
the teaching of science. Concommitantly, I wish to point out that I
am not advocating tha t an academician's goal should be the development of an undisciplined mind in the student.
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With rare exceptions, most science curricula, as well as courses and
books for the science and non-science ma jors, have been perpetua ting
the m yth that science is an experience of m a n, lacking the esthetic, if
not other epiphenomena! elements of humanism. I believe tha t we as
science educators have not faced up to the urgency of responsibilities
we owe to both the science and non-science maj ors. Ian Barbour has
said, "Science teachers give more a ttention to 'the logic of the discovered' than to the process of discovery. To some extent this is inevitable, for a teacher wants to present principles in a systematic way ;
but often students gain little understanding of the scientific enterprise .
. . . Science should be treated not as a noun but as a verb, a form of
human activi ty." ( 1) In a review, J oel Snow analyzes the problem in
science education this way, "Science topics are usually discussed either
by a post h oc reordering of the facts to provide 'logical' continuity or
by steady plodding along a chronological trail. A cult of objectivity
seems to require that the doubt, conflict, and intuition which play a
m ajor p art in scientific discovery be replaced by systematic description of the one true knowledge in imita tion of the technique whereby
the quoted proofs of a ma thema tical theorem serve to disguise its
mode of di scovery and significance. A cult of manners seems to imply
tha t all scientists are good, true and brilliant ( never beautiful! ), and
tha t only adjectives of praise, wonder, or astonishment can be applied
both to them a nd their works. It is hardly surprising that, with the
huma n juices so assiduously d rained out, most people prefer not to
read books about science." (2) If we a re to educate our non-science
students successfully, we must demonstrate that science has a more
meaningful relationship to the living experience of m an by integrating
science into the context of the socio-cultural milieu.
From the m anner in which college science programs a re set up,
it would appear to the student that the administrators are ignorant
of their view of the world problems. They hear administrators and
the disciplinarians tell them that this or that subject matter or discipline is related to these world problems but they don't follow through
in making them revelant. " In the Middle Ages, . . . , the university
understandably structured its curriculum with theology as the core
subject, since it was R egina S cientiarum. \,Vha tever we may think
today of the actual 'scientific' content of medieval theology, it played
an integrating role by providing all the other subjects with a n inner
logic a nd cohesion. In contrast, the a tomistic structure of contemporary multiversities a ttests not only to an explosion of knowledge
but also to the absence of a corpus of postulates such as provided the
conceptual cement for m edieval scholars, whether training to be
theologians, doctors, lawyers, or, as with Roger Bacon, what we might
call proto-scientists. On today's campus, the clashing of values and
methodologies- to say nothing of terminologies--of disparate disciplines
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provides an overview of chaos in place of the medieval cosmos. Little
wonder, then, that today's student all too often feels not only bewildered but exposed to schizoid tendencies in his intellectual
environment." (3)
Traditionally in education, science has been treated as "ethically"
neutral in the sense that its findings can be used in the service of a
variety of human goals. The scientific enterprise, in and of itself,
contains many humanistic values, such as co-operation, honesty and
freedom of inquiry. "Considered in isolation, the scientific instrument
or products can be used for good and bad ends. Hence they are
ethically neutral. However, false inferences have been made that values
must have some other basis than science. This is because there is more
to science than its products ... There are also 1) the theory without
which the instruments would not have been invented, and 2) the
method by which this theory is grounded in or related to immediately
apprehended fact . . . neither of these two factors is ethically neutral." ( 4) We are living in an age when ma n is grossly accelerating
the change of his environment. We are faced with living now in a
scientific age with both non-scientific and antiscientific attitudes. How
do we get the student to understand his anxiety in light of a bigger
picture (his is the "superficial" view, one of world starvation, massive
environmental pollution, loss of personal identity, atomic warfare,
etc.) ?
I see teaching science as one of the liberal arts to non-science
majors as a two-fold project. The first goal is to illustrate science as
a human experience. That the "scientific method" is more than the
methods of induction, of deduction or of postulation-deduction. ( 5-8)
In order to attain this goal, it would be necessary to compare and
contrast the nature of validation of knowledge in science, as well as in
the other human experiences of religion and the arts. (9-12 ) One must
also demonstrate interfaces between the findings of science and the
sociological or theological values of m an. ( 1, 13-24) Also, one h as to
examine how science can or cannot be used by man to solve man's
social problems.
Some academicians will argue that this is diluting science. It is
not teaching science in and of itself. I realize in exceptional cases, the
"purist" can make the students realize all of these points within the
framework of a disciplinary approach. However, the evidence is too
blatantly clear, after examination of textbooks and curriculum for
non-science majors, tha t the students are not getting the holistic picture.
I, however, do not believe one has to sacrifice the intellectual beauty
of science, per se, in order to achieve an understanding of the place
science plays in our human experience.
To achieve these ends, a science teacher today has an enormous
number of approaches to develop the aforementioned ideas. For exam-
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pie, I have found that in teaching the biological sciences to non-science
majors, the following approach seemed to satisfy the students and my
own demands of a challenging, and intellectually honest approach.
This course is the second in a series of three term courses. The first
deals with the nature of the universe and the last is c:onceme<l with
the nature of man.
The weekly class format was based on two one-hour "lectures," with
one two-hour demonstration-discussion session and one one-hour recitation session. The readings were 1) Language of Life by G. and
M. Beadle; 2) Of Molecules and Men by F. Crick; 3) Double Helix
by J. D. Watson and 4) selected other readings.
The L anguage of Life provides the basic framework for the course.
Emphasis is placed not only on questions of the nature and origin of
life, but also on the methods by which such knowledge is obtained . As
a model for the scientific approach to the phenomenon of life, the
hereditary process is examined. The changing conceptions of this
process, from Mendel's "factors" to the coded information of DNA,
provides one of the clearest examples in science of the logic, creativity, and elegance that go into the construction of a theory. On the
question of which subject should be taught to liberal arts students to
give them insight into science and the scientific method, C. P. Snow
has recently suggested the structure and replication of DNA; this area
is treated by the Beadles with the utmost lucidity.
The Double Helix provides an unusual opportunity to humanize
a scientific discovery. After the student has gained an understanding
of the revolutionary impact of the DNA concept upon the scientific
view of life, he will be able to appreciate the immense creativity inherent in the practice of science, so convincingly documented by Watson. The image of the scientist as an impersonal calculating machine
will not survive a reading of this book.
The philosophical implications of the molecular view of biology
are discussed by Francis Crick in Of Molecules and Men. This book
consists of three lectures which Crick delivered to a general audience
on the role of vitalism in contempora ry biology; in particular, whether
the concepts of physics and chemistry are sufficient to explain the
functioning of a cell, the origin of life, and the nature of consciousness.
The mechanistic viewpoint characteristic of much of recent biological
thought is given a provocative and argumentative presentation; this
material is designed to provide a stimulating basis for class discussion.
The major objectives of the course were to examine critically the
scientists', theologians' and humanists' views of the phenomenon of life.
Specifically, I singled out only a few of the areas normally covered
( creation of life and "like breeds like") and examined the interaction
between cultural elements (i.e., religion and philosophy) and the
scientific enterprise in both historical and modern settings. Only by
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examining some historical examples does the analysis of modern scientific explanations h ave a real, holistic meaning to our students.
Pedagogically, I start all class activities with observations which
are designed to stimulate discussion (i.e., congentially-deformed children ) . We discuss how different cultural elements of p ast and contemporary societies influence the explanations of these observations and
the explanations m ay influence non-scientific cultural institutions. In
essence, I try to examine biology, not as a unique method of explanation or as a collection of facts existing in a vacuum, but as a human
activity, which is shaped by the individual investiga tor and cultural
forces and which affect world views.
In order to set a challenging situation which can be pragmatically,
if not intellectually stimulating, I have adapted an approach, synthesized from Northrup(4) and Peckham ( lO ), to illustra te how a creative act of explanation is born. Since man's confronta tion with ch aos
leads to problems: 1) of logical inconsistencies of his present ideas,
2 ) problems of fact or 3) of values, I try to design the classroom
observations to provide ambiguous situations, which can call for several
quite different and mutually exclusive patterns of scientific as well as
ethical decisions.
I have tried to make biology holistic. I am sure some of m y students m ay never know the structures and presumed functions of all
cell organelles, however, I am sure they h ave been made aware of
m any of the non-scientific elements with which the scientific study of
life has interacted. Henry Adams has declared " Nothing in education
is so astonishing as the amount of ignorance it accumulates in the
form of inert facts." (25) General education in science should be, as
Lord Rusholm has said "permanent stimulus to continuing selfeducation." (26)
The second goal is to encourage a student's own creative involvement in his learning experience. To enh ance diversity, a re-evaluation
of the role of science education in the intellectual experience of students must be made. This will entail a head -on confrontation 1) with
traditional-minded science educators, ( " those who let examina tion
m arks be the reward for passive acceptance of revealed doctrine" ) (27 ); 2) with university administrators who find it efficient to
have grades for students ("The business of a professor is to give, not
grades, but intellectual contagion ." ) (28 ) ; and 3) with the students
who feel that any non-vocational course is a hindrance to their
professional career.
I do believe that, as teachers, we have a responsibility to evalua te
the students' progress in their educational growth in order that they
can be aware of their deficiencies. Evaluation should be made, but the
emphasis on their meaning and of their use within and without the
university should be reduced. (29) I contend that the discussion of
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human values should be an integral pa rt of a general education course.
I'm not sure tha t, even if the students could be evaluated for this
aspect of the course, it would be ethically right to do so.
In our attempts to provide general education in science for la rge
numbers of non-science students, we have demanded a conformity of
behavior. Dobzhansky states m y feelings well when he remarked " I for
one do not lament the p assing of social organizations that use the
many as a m anured soil in which to grow a few graceful flowers of
refined culture."(30) Rene Dubos has also pointed out that" . .. excessive concern with productivity and efficiency interferes with the
pursuit of significance." ( 15) We must remember we are " teaching
students rather than subjects, and for their own sakes ... " (27)
Most importantly, "We must shun uniformity of surrounding as
much as absolute conformity to behavior, and make instead a deliberate effort to create as many diversified environments as possible.
This may result in some loss of efficiency, but the more important
goal is to provide the man y kinds of soil that will permit the germination of the seeds now dormant in man's nature. Insofar as possible,
the duplication of uniformity must yield to the organization of diversi ty. Richness and variety of the physical and social environment
constitute crucial aspects of functionalism-whether in the planning of
cities, the design of dwellings, or the management of life." (31)
James E. Trosko
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